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assumption that housing is an indivisible, illiquid asset that restricts the portfolio choice deci-
sion. The analysis also includes the nancial constraints households may face when they apply
for external funding. The set of nancial assets that constitute the households portfolios are
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Survey of Household Finance. In comparison with the optimal portfolio, households signi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1. Introduction
Investing in housing represents the main asset for households in many countries, particu-
larly in Spain, where housing represented an average of 66.5% of the total assets in household
portfolios in 2002 and 66.1% in 2005. According to the Spanish Household Budget Contin-
uous Survey (ECPF) carried out by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), the
percentage of homeowners increased from 84% in 2002 to 86% in 2005. These percentages
suggest the importance of considering housing in analyses of householdsoptimal portfolio
decisions. The vast literature on portfolio choice, starting with Markowitz (1952), Samuelson
(1969), and Merton (1971) does not include housing explicitly. For example, recent articles
by Ameriks and Zeldes (2000) or Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) focus solely on the
impact of the life cycle on household portfolios. By excluding housing, these studies also fail
to include housing-related nancial liabilities (i.e., mortgages) in their models of households
portfolio decisions. One way to take housing investments into account is di¤erentiating liquid
from illiquid assets, as do Koren and Szeidl (2002), Schwartz and Tebaldi (2006) and Anglin
and Gao (2011). This di¤erentiation implicitly considers investments in housing and mort-
gages, though the high heterogeneity among illiquid assets likely makes it necessary to deal
separately with housing and mortgage investments.
Even recent research that includes housing and mortgage as additional nancial assets or
liabilities into household portfolio choice decisions tends to consider housing as a standard
nancial asset, in the sense that investors can decide what amount to invest in housing every
year. Cocco (2005) employs a model in which in every period, the investor chooses the size
of housings share in an optimal portfolio. However, housing is not a standard nancial asset
whose size in the portfolio can be chosen freely in every period by selling or buying a certain
portion of it. Of course, housing yields a return derived from its appreciation or depreciation
(capital gains/losses) and has an opportunity cost of actually using the house as a place to
live, which also require consideration. In our view, housing is an indivisible, illiquid asset;
that is, it can be thought of as a durable consumption good.1 This view is in line with Flavin
and Yamashita (2002) who focus on the impact of the portfolio constraint imposed by the
consumption demand for housing on the households optimal holdings of nancial assets. For
this reason, we consider that housing constitutes a restrictionon portfolio choice, as an
investment already undertaken, that determines the investment in the other nancial assets.
Kallberg, Liu, and Greig (1996) address the separation among di¤erent types of assets in
1Grossman and Laroque (1990) employ a similar perspective, though they restrict the portfolio composition
to stocks. Kallberg, Liu, and Greig (1996) also incorporate the real estate imperfections of indivisible assets
and no short sales in their analysis of the role of direct real estate investment by real estate funds in a
portfolio context.
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the portfolio optimization context of real estate funds. These authors optimize rst over
all properties and then use the resulting real estate portfolio to subsequently optimize over
the remaining nancial assets. They conclude that the separation to selecting real estate
represents a good approximation.
Finally, household portfolio choice literature su¤ers from a pervasive shortage of data on
real-world householdsportfolio choices. Such data might allow a more realistic assessment
of the divergences between theory and practice though. Campbell (2006) suggests it is hard
to obtain these necessary data, because households tend to guard their nancial privacy
jealously. The lack of data thus has forced some analysts, including Longsta¤ (2001) and
Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), to perform simulations instead of testing their models
with actual data.
To overcome this limitation, we employ the Spanish survey of household nance (EFF), a
unique data set that gives us data (missing in other studies) to combine a theoretical model
with actual data of Spanish familiesnancial decisions. Other studies employing a similar ap-
proach refer to U.S. and U.K. micro data , such as Campbell and Cocco (2007), Cocco (2005),
and Flavin and Yamashita (2002). With micro data from the United Kingdom, Campbell and
Cocco analyze how uctuations in housing prices a¤ect householdsconsumption decisions.
Cocco determines how the investment in housing a¤ects the portfolio composition of U.S.
households and nds that the average portfolio shares of stocks, bills, and real estate are
4.9%, 2.9%, and 92.2%, respectively, for households with a nancial net worth less than
$100,000, but they shift to 46%, 1.3%, and 52.7% for households with a nancial net worth
of at least $100,000. Finally, Flavin and Yamashita employ a mean-variance framework to
study the impact of the portfolio constraints derived from the consumption of housing in the
United States. For all housing-to-net wealth ratios (i.e., the ratio of house value to wealth),
and assuming a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion equal to 2, which is the same that we use in
our analysis, households should maintain a portfolio in which the amount of their mortgage
is equal to the value of their house.2 The rest of the portfolio should be invested, on average,
0% in treasury bills, 27% in treasury bonds, and 73% in stocks.
This article analyzes the optimization problem faced by homeowners. The household must
determine the amount of the investment in housing to be funded by a mortgage, which in
turn conditions the demand for other nancial assets. We frame this optimization problem
as a reallocation problem, in which the households wealth is assigned across di¤erent as-
sets (stocks, bank time deposits, and mortgage), conditioned to the housing value. When a
household purchases a house, it does so because the house is consistent with either its true
preferences or preferences restricted to its nancial situation. Thus actual housing could dif-
2They assume that the maximum portion of mortgage relative to housing value is 100%.
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fer from the desired state. To solve this problem, we investigate households living in their
desired housing to reduce the risk that they would move in the short-run. In addition, we
focus on households who bought housing recently to reduce uncertainty.3 We estimate the
desired house value using Mayordomos (2008) method and consider housing as the desired
one whenever its desired value is below the housings market price. With this assumption,
we posit that the desired housing represents an illiquid nancial asset, from the households
perspective, that will not be traded in the near future. Moreover, this premise enables us to
assume that households solve a problem with innite time horizons in which housing appears
as a permanent nancial restriction.
In the empirical section, we rst study the actual composition of the householdsportfo-
lios, noting di¤erent demographic and nancial characteristics. Then, we estimate an optimal
investment portfolio for individual households and for di¤erent categories. Finally, by com-
bining the two previous analyses, we can detect the demographic and nancial characteristics
that cause deviations from a households optimal portfolio, that is, deviations between actual
and optimal investments.
Our study adds to the existing literature in several ways. Our contributions to the method-
ology are: rst, we use four nancial assets in the optimization problem (stocks, bank time
deposits, mortgage, and housing) instead of two assets (e.g., one liquid and one illiquid),
as is commonly employed in prior literature. Second, we extend Koren and Szeidls (2002)
optimization methodology by including stock risk. And third, we consider the restrictions
derived from the housing purchase that a¤ect the mortgage decision. Our empirical contri-
butions are: we use the Bank of Spains EFF, a unique data set of Spanish households micro
data, to compute actual portfolios and estimate the optimal portfolios for di¤erent individual
households, as well as for di¤erent groups of households attending to several demographic
characteristics. Finally, once the optimal portfolio has been estimated, we compare actual
and optimal portfolios and study the factors a¤ecting the actual portfolios deviations from
the optimal one.
Our models baseline results show that the average actual proportion invested by Spanish
households in housing is 128.2% of their total net wealth, and in turn, the optimal (actual)
proportion invested in stocks is 1.6% (0.6%), the optimal (actual) proportion invested in
bank time deposits is 4.9% (3.1%), and the optimal (actual) average investment in mortgage
is -34.7% (-31.9%) of total net wealth. Statistical signicance tests indicate that Spanish
households tend to invest signicantly less in stocks and deposits than theory indicate they
should. However their optimal and actual investment in mortage is not dissimilar. We also
3The more years in a given housing situation, the higher is the uncertainty about the preferences of the
household and the greater the probability of moving.
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nd a signicant relationship between the optimal proportion invested in stocks and deposits
on the one hand and the age, education level, degree of nancial sophistication, household
income, and net wealth of members of the household on the other. Signicant di¤erences
between the optimal and the actual investment in mortgages are only found in the case
of highly nancially sophisticated households and the individuals more than 55 years old
or retired. The actual proportion of housing decreases with the age, education level, and
household net wealth.
In Section 2, we describe the theoretical optimization model and the semi-analytical
technique that we employ to solve it. Section 3 deals with the calibration procedure. In Section
4, we describe the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. In Section 6, we present a
comparative statics analysis and in Section 7, we analyze the household characteristics that
determine the deviation of the actual portfolios from the optimal ones. Section 8 concludes.
2. Model
We present the portfolio decision problem for a household subject to nancial or borrowing
restrictions due to its housing investment and exposure to liquidity shocks. As in Koren and
Szeidl (2002), we use a relatively simple functional form that enables us to nd a semi-
analytic solution for the value function and for the optimal consumption and portfolio policy.
We analyze a time-discrete portfolio choice decision model for innitely persisting households
with exogenous initial wealth and labor income, such that the utility function has a constant
relative risk aversion coe¢ cient.
We assume that the household can invest in three types of assets: liquid, semi-liquid,
and illiquid. The liquid assets are stocks available to the household that can be employed
in the very short run for consumption.4 The set of illiquid assets comprises the house and
the mortgage used to buy that housing. We assume that among the illiquid assets, the only
tradable asset is the mortgage, whereas the investment in housing is given and remains
constant over time. Therefore we restrict our analysis to households living in their desired
house, to reduce the risk that they would move in the short-run. Choosing households that
dwell in their desired home is crucial; otherwise, there is uncertainty about the time period
the household will remain in the less desired home, such that the house provides transitory
4Mutual funds might be additional instrument to consider in this optimization problem. However, most
mutual funds investments involve equity or xed-income, so we consider this nancial instrument partly
represented by deposits and equity instruments. The same argument holds for the absence of pension funds
among the set of assets we consider. Thus, we avoid using redundant assets but still select the most rep-
resentative assets of Spanish householdsportfolios. Finally, we also ignore contractual savings for housing,
because the decision about the amount to allocate to this asset occurs before the housing purchase, which
we consider a given, so this asset should not a¤ect the portfolio choice or reallocation problem.
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housing to be sold before buying the desired one. The way housing a¤ects allocation choices
is di¤erent if the level of consumption of housing services is optimally set or it is considered
as an exogenous constraint a¤ecting the investment decision. Focusing in the households
living in the desired housing guarantees the role of housing not just as an investment but
also a durable consumption good. Thus, independently on whether the housing investment
is the optimal or not, the households who live in their desired home should not be planning
to optimize the investment in housing because they are not interested in moving. For this
reason, we can consider this investment as an investment already undertaken and otherwise
the inclusion of housing in the portfolio optimization of these households could bias the
results.
Apart from liquid and illiquid assets, we include a semi-liquid asset, namely, bank time
deposits, that yield a riskless return.5 This class of assets commonly imposes restrictions
on the investment horizon or the availability of funds to make payments. Moreover, this
class encompasses a wide variety of investment products with varying characteristics. To
be consistent with the information provided by the EFF, we employ a standard bank time
deposit. Such deposits are not available to households in the very short run, unless they pay
a cancellation fee. Therefore, the household employs these deposits in the very short run,
subject to a penalty payment, or waits until maturity. The latter decision implies that these
deposits may be employed to make payments or consumed in the future. In this case, the
household receives the interest payment and does not pay any cancellation fee.6
Contrary to previous literature, we do not restrict our model to just liquid or illiquid
assets, because in each of the three subgroups we consider, the assets present di¤erent char-
acteristics, returns, and volatilities. We thus assume that the market for mortgages and
deposits, assuming the household does not pay the deposit cancellation fee, operates with a
lag with respect to the liquid assets. The household is free to place any order to buy and sell
at the prevailing price at any point in time. However, an order placed at the beginning of
period t will only be executed at the end of that period, after consumption has taken place.
Although the availability of liquid assets for consumption is immediate, illiquid assets are
not available for immediate consumption. This formulation captures the time needed to sell
a given asset, which mainly reects liquidity. The household therefore solves the following
optimization problem:
5Other studies employ xed-income instruments such as short- and long-run government bonds. We em-
ploy deposits instead of other xed-income instruments because of the low presence of such assets in Spanish
householdsportfolios. Less than 2% of households invest in either sovereign or corporate xed-income in-
struments; more than 15% of households invest in bank time deposits.
6The standard bank time deposit is similar to a xed-term deposit.
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max
fCt;t+1g
E0
1X
t=0
tt
C1 t
1   (1)
s:t: : Wt = 
0
tWt (i)
0t1 = 1 (ii)
t;M 6 0 (iii)
t;i > 0 for i = 1; :::; 3 (iv)
Ct 6 (t;1 + t;2(1  fee) + rt;p   2r2)Wt + Lt (v)
Rt;p = 1 + rt;p (vi)
0trt = rt;p (vii)
Wt+1 = Rt;pWt   Ct + Lt (viii)
 0.8Ht 6 t;MWt 6 0 (ix)
Rt;Mt;MWt 6 0.33Yt; (x)
where Ct represents consumption at time t;  is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient,  is the
subjective discount factor that measures the preference for future consumption, and t is the
taste (liquidity) shock at a given time, independent and identically distributed over time.
We assume that when a household su¤ers a liquidity shock in a given period, the marginal
utility of consumption increases with respect to that observed in normal times, which causes
households to consume more during a liquidity shock. Furthermore, Wt represents the total
nancial net wealth obtained as the sum of liquid, illiquid, and semi-liquid assets (restriction
i). The vector 0t features the share of wealth held in each nancial asset at the beginning of
t, so the sum of the components of the vector is equal to 1 (restriction ii). This vector also
consists of liquid (stocks, t;1) semi-liquid (bank time deposits, t;2), and illiquid (housing,
t;3; and mortgage, t;M ) assets, respectively. The vector 0t+1 includes the share of wealth
invested in each nancial asset, once the order placed at time t has been settled, which
means the portfolio recomputation, started at time t has been completed. Among these
s, we include the proportion of wealth invested in the mortgage, t;M ; and because it is
equivalent to a short position in a bond, we set its value to be negative (restriction iii):7 The
other portfolio weights are restricted to be positive (restriction iv), because we assume no
7Another illiquid nancial assets, such as bonds or long-run deposits, that cannot be used in the short
run after the payment of a cancellation fee would be a perfect substitute for an opposite position in the
mortgage. In that case, if the illiquid assets returns are higher than the mortgage, the investor would demand
the maximum amount of mortgage to invest in that asset. If the returns are lower than the mortgage rate,
investors will not invest in it. Therefore, the share invested in the illiquid asset and the mortgage cancel each
other.
6
short sales are allowed. Because household needs to borrow to fund the housing purchase,
consumption cannot be higher than total holdings in stocks and deposits, plus the return
earned on asset holdings and the labor income at year t; which we denote as Lt:8 Moreover,
when the household withdraws the bank time deposit before maturity, it pays a cancellation
fee, denoted fee; and does not receive the returns derived from such investment (2r2).9
Restriction v illustrates this scenario. The Rt and rt vectors contain the gross and net real
return of all nancial assets (deated by the appropriate price index), respectively, from
period t to period t + 1 (restriction vi), so for example, Rt;M is the gross return of the
mortgage. In contrast, rt;p refers to the net portfolio return, composed of the weighted average
of rt; where the weights depend on the portion of wealth invested in the corresponding asset
(restriction vii). Total net wealth one step ahead (Wt+1) is the updated portfolio value plus
labor income minus consumption in period t (restriction viii).
The model also imposes two constraints related to mortgage policy recommendations. Ht
is the housings value at time t; and Yt is the householdsincome at time t: First, the mortgage
must be lower than 80% of the value of the housing. The value 0.8 is common for all the
households and compatible with a banks standard provisions. If this proportion is higher
than 0.8; the provisions o¤ered by the lender must increase (see de Lis, Martinez Pagés and
Saurina (2001) for further details). Thus, this constraint aligns with good banking practices
in banks, which generally do not lend the whole value of the house, to avoid moral hazard
problems and ensure the compatibility of incentives (restriction ix). During the period of the
surveys (2002 and 2005), the ratio of mortgage to housing value was 80% and in more recent
years (2006, 2007), this ratio increased towards (and even surpassed) 100%.
Second, the mortgage payments must be lower than 33% of household income. This
nancial constraint, set by nancial institutions, helps ensure that the household will be able
to pay the mortgage and avoids potential high delinquency ratios. The value 0.33 represents
an approximation in relation to the income requirements that a given household must fulll
to obtain the loan (restriction x).10
The taste (liquidity) shock at time t is independently and identically distributed over
8We consider labor income an implicit holding of safe assets, such that the household receives a xed
amount of money every month for the rest of its life.
9This fee is equal to 5%, the average bank time depositsreturn during the study period, as we explain
in the calibration section. We use a fee equal to the previous percentage because if the bank time deposit
is cancelled, the investor does not receive the whole notional but rather the notional minus a given amount,
which cannot exceed the received interest. Because we work in annual terms, we use this 5% to control for
the received interest without imposing any concrete investment horizon.
10In their study of how credit quality a¤ects homeownership in the United States, Barakova et al. (2003)
use a ratio of mortgage to housing value of 90%; and a limit for the mortgage payments relative to household
income of 33%. For more robust results, we develop a sensitivity analysis in Section 6 in which we modify
the percentages employed in the nancial restrictions (80% for wealth and 33% for income).
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time, and can take two only values:
t =

 > 1 with probability 
1 with probability 1  : (2)
When t = ; the investor su¤ers a liquidity shock in period t: If  > 1; the marginal utility of
consumption is higher during a liquidity shock than at normal times, which leads households
to consume more during a liquidity shock.
The taste shock is independently distributed over time, so there are only two state vari-
ables, total net wealth (Wt) and the share of nancial assets (t): With these two states in
terms of the shock realization, we consider two di¤erent types of consumption for each house-
hold. When there is a liquidity shock, the household consumes C1;t; otherwise, it consumes
C2;t: In addition to the liquidity state and a wide number of available nancial assets, we
assume there are three states of nature that are closely related to the state of the economy.
Ideally, we would consider three di¤erent states of nature for each asset (i.e., 64 states), but
for the sake of tractability, we concentrate on the three states of nature dened by the stock
indexes. This decision reects the close relation between the economy and the stock indexes.
Moreover, stocks are the riskiest assets among the set of nancial assets employed in this
analysis. We therefore assume a favorable state when the return of the stock index, or in
Spain the IBEX35, exceeds the third quartile of its distribution; an intermediate state when
the return is between the rst and the third quartiles and an unfavorable state when the
return is below the rst quartile of its distribution. The stock returns also include dividends.
We include six control variables for consumption, depending on the states of nature associ-
ated with both the liquidity regime and the economic regime. Moreover, we have an extra
control variable, that is, the next periods portfolio share for every nancial asset.11
The timing for asset trade, consumption, and interest earned in our model is as follows:
at the beginning of period t; the interest earned on the portfolio between period t and t+ 1,
determined at t   1, is paid in advance. Then, the taste shock is realized. Given the taste
shock, the household chooses consumption subject to its current liquidity constraints, as well
as the portfolio composition for the next period. Then, the state of nature is realized. At
the end of period t, the buy or sell order is executed on the market, and thus the portfolio
composition at t+ 1 is determined. We illustrate this timing in Figure 1.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
11Koren and Szeidl (2002) only consider two assets, liquid and illiquid, without taking into account any
division in each category. Moreover, they limit the investors uncertainty to the existence of a liquidity shock
that exists in two potential consumption regimes. However, they ignore the states of nature dened by the
asset returns.
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The value function and households optimal program can be characterized by the following
Bellman equation:
V (W;0) =max
0
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

26666664
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
max
CH1 6Liq:WealthH
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(3)
where Liq: Wealthi = (1+2(1 fee)+rip 2r2)W+L (for i = H;M;L) refers to the liquid
wealth in each state of nature, as summarized in restriction v in the optimization problem
Equation (1). In turn, CH1 , C
M
1 ; and C
L
1 represent the consumption prole in a favorable (H),
an intermediate (M); and a unfavorable (L) state if a liquidity shock occurs. The consumption
prole in a normal regime with no liquidity shock is dened by CH2 ; C
M
2 ; and C
L
2 for the same
three states: favorable, intermediate, and unfavorable, respectively. Parameter  represents
the probability of the occurrence of a taste (liquidity) shock. Parameters 1 and 2 represent
the probabilities of the occurrences of a favorable and an intermediate state, respectively. The
returns rHp , r
M
p ; and r
L
p (R
H
p ; R
M
p ; and R
L
p ) refer to the net (gross) portfolio returns, obtained
in the three possible states, H; M; and L; respectively. Finally, the vector 0 denotes the
fraction of wealth in each of the nancial assets after this periods order is executed.
The intuition behind the Bellman equation is as follows: there are three di¤erent states
of nature, favorable (H), intermediate (M); and unfavorable (L). Because the riskiest asset
is the stock, we consider the three states of nature (scenarios) determined by the stock
returns behavior. Thus, using historical stock returns, we dene a favorable scenario as one
in which the average real annual returns exceed 37.77%. In 2002, this return corresponds to
the 75th percentile in the stock returns distribution of the IBEX35 index, so the probability
of this scenario is 25%, represented by the parameter 1: The intermediate scenario occurs
when the average return falls between the 25th and 75th percentiles, such that the average
annual stock return is between 37.77% and -13.87% in 2002, observed with a probability
of 50% (i.e., 2 = 0.5). In an intermediate scenario, the investors receive the average of the
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stocks returns distribution, equal to 16.86%. Finally, the unfavorable scenario corresponds
to average annual stock returns below -13.87% in 2002, which represents the 25th percentiles
occurs with a probability of 25% (i.e., 1   1   2):12 The state of nature conditions the
stockreturns. It is important to note that these returns also include dividends. Before the
state of nature is known, a liquidity shock may happen with probability . When a liquidity
shock occurs, current consumption delivers higher marginal utility, so the marginal utility
increases by . However, consumption cannot be more than current liquid wealth, and the
constraint is binding in the maximization problem (Equation (3)). The next-period net wealth
equals the net wealth plus the interest earned in this period and the labor income minus the
consumption. The second part of the maximization problem (Equation (3)) describes the
case in which there is no liquidity shock, but we still must consider the e¤ect of the state
of the economy. This maximization can be interpreted similarly to that which corresponds
to the part of the liquidity shock. We assume that both the liquidity shock and the state of
nature are independent over time, in any of the six possible regime/state combinations, and
the household chooses the same optimal portfolio share for the next period, 0, before the
state of nature is known.
Because all the constraints are linear in consumption and wealth, and the utility function
is a power utility, the value function is homogeneous to degree 1    in wealth. In turn we
can show that there exist a function () such that13
V (W;0) = () 
W 1 
1   : (4)
The existence of homogeneity in wealth means that the investors portfolio share choice
for next period is independent of wealth. The implication is that there is an optimal portfolio
share to be invested in the assets, 0i for i in 1; 2; 3; and M . Thus, according to the previous
expression, the value function is maximal for any wealth level when ()  1
1  is maximal.
For  > 1, it can be formally expressed as
 = argmax

(): (5)
12The stock return distribution shows that these annual returns are lower (higher) than -13.87% (37.77%)
with a probability of 25%. We use the more conservative scenario in which the returns in the unfavorable
(favorable) scenario are -13.87 (37.77%), but not the average of the returns below (over) this threshold.
13Koren and Szeidl (2002) o¤er a proof for this statement; they consider a given positive constant k; such
that k > 0: Because all constraints are linear, the optimal contingent plan for initial wealth kW and portfolio
 will be just k times the optimal contingent plan for initial wealth W and porfolio share : Then, the per
period utility is homogeneous to the degree 1  , so it follows that the total value of initial wealth kW will
be equal to k1  times the total value of initial wealth W . Therefore the value function of the problem will
also be homogeneous to the degree 1   ; and it is also a smooth function of W . For this reason, it must
assume the functional form in Equation (4).
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To solve this optimization problem, we adopt Koren and Szeidls (2002) methodology.
We already know that the optimal policy involves a constant share of liquid wealth and that
the value function is separable in W . Thus, we begin by dening the subset of all feasible
policies from all restrictions that involve portfolio shares . The optimal policy falls within
this subset and corresponds to the one that o¤ers higher utility for the consumer (i.e., rst
best policy). Liquidity shocks could appear during householdslives, causing the consumer
to spend all the liquid wealth on consumption, because before the next period, they have a
new opportunity to rebalance their portfolios. These possible rebalances make holding more
liquidity than needed during a liquidity shock unnecessary. However, consumption during a
liquidity shock is limited by the amount of liquid assets and the total portfolios returns, such
that the consumption in this regime is less than the consumption in the unconstrained rst
best policy. In an unfavorable state, the household may be unwilling to hold stocks, because
they give negative returns, but we assume that the preference for consumption in the case
of a liquidity shock is so high that the household sells its stocks in spite of any potential
losses. Similarly. a preference for consumption leads the household to withdraw its bank time
deposits, despite any cancellation fees.
For an optimal policy of this form, we focus on a set of policies consistent with the optimal
policy. That is, during a liquidity shock, all the liquid and semi-liquid wealth is consumed;
otherwise, the household chooses consumption optimally. We solve the problem for xed
values of ; denoted e; which include the optimal policy, and impose the extra restrictions
we detailed previously. This approach is equivalent to solving the optimal problem with one
extra restriction, which eliminate some of the control variables such as consumption given a
liquidity shock. This simplication leads to a modied problem that is much easier to solve.
Accordingly, we set the grid of e that satises all restrictions and employ them to obtain
the optimal value given by the portfolio shares e: Thus, we rst must characterize the value
function of the modied problem for any e; then maximize by substituting over the grid ofe to obtain e: This value function is denoted eV (W; e0); and we can show that the value of
the modied problem is less than or equal to the value of the original problem, with equality,
if and only if e =  :
eV (W; e0) 6 V (W; e0): (6)
The homogeneity property of the utility function means the value function of the modied
problem also will be homogeneous to the degree 1  in wealth. As in Equation (3), we have:
eV (W; e0) = f(e) W 1 
1   : (7)
In summary, we recast the initial optimization problem into a simpler modied problem,
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and to solve it, we set a grid of e that represents di¤erent portfolios that hold all required
restrictions. Once the grid of portfolios is set, we replace each portfolio in the value functioneV (W; e0) to nd the portfolio that gives the maximum eV (W; e0): From Equation (7), to nd
the optimal value function, we must dene the function f(:) rst. Once we dene f(:); the
problem is reduced to maximizing f(e) in e to nd e and to nding the optimal consumption
when there is no liquidity shock, that is, the rst best rule consumption.
The value function under the modied problem is given by the following Bellman equation:
eV (W;e0) =
8>>><>>>:
26664
1
h

CH;1 1
1  +
eV (RHp W   CH1 +L;e0)i+
+2
h

CM;1 1
1  +
eV (RMp W   CM1 +L;e0)i+
+(1  1 2)
h

CL;1 1
1  +
eV (RLpW   CL1+L;e0)i
37775+
+(1  )maxe0
26666664
1

max
CH2 6Liq:WealthH
h
CH;1 2
1  +
eV (RHp W   CH2 +L;e0)i+
+2

max
CM2 6Liq:WealthM
h
CM;1 2
1  +
eV (RMp W   CM2 +L;e0)i+
+(1  1 2)

max
CL2 6Liq:WealthL
h
CL;1 2
1  +
eV (RLpW   CL2+L;e0)i
37777775
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
(8)
where by assumption, CH1 = (1+2(1 fee)+rHp  2r2)W+L = Liq:WealthH ; CM1 =(1+
2(1 fee)+ rMp  2r2)W +L = Liq:WealthM ; and CL1 =(1+2(1 fee)+ rLp  2r2)W +
L = Liq:WealthL. This expression is obtained by rewriting the original Bellman equation,
imposing the restrictions that the portfolio share must be equal to e; and assuming that the
household consumes all liquid wealth (stocks, deposits, assets returns, and labor income)
during a shock. The last restriction implies that in the modied problem, only consumption
in the normal state (CH2 , C
M
2 ; and C
L
2 ) remains as a choice variable. This consumption level
is determined as follows: if the households liquidity constraint is not binding in the normal
state (because it has enough cash), then Ci2 (for i = H;M;L) can be chosen according to the
rst-order condition of the problem.
From the Bellman Equation (8), and using the functional form of Equation (7), we derive
the rst-order condition of Ci2:
Cifoc;2 =
f(e) 1=  RipW + L
1   1=f(e) for i = H;M;L: (9)
If the liquidity constraint binds and the household consumes all its liquid wealth, then:
Ciconst;2 = (1 + 2(1  fee) + rip   2r2)W + L for i = H;M;L: (10)
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Note that Cifoc;2 is only feasible if C
i
foc;2  Ciconst;2. For this reason, the household chooses
Ci2 as the minimum of these two consumption levels:
Ci2 = mn
(
(1 + 2(1  fee) + rip   2r2)W + L;
f(e) 1=  RipW + L
1   1=f(e)
)
for i = H;M;L:
(11)
According to these expressions, there should be a level of the portfolio weights at which
the liquidity constraint becomes binding in the normal state, and hence, Cifoc;2 and C
i
const;2
coincide. For such a level of portfolio weights in which the consumption obtained from the
rst-order condition is higher than the constraint consumption in all states of nature, the
corresponding value function, f1(e); is given by
f1(e) = "1   (1  e1   e2(1  fee))1 
 + (1  )
# 1
 
1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 +
+2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1  +
+(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 
 1

: (12)
The value functions implicit expression for the level of portfolio weights in which the
consumption obtained from the rst-order condition is lower than or equal to the constraint
consumption in all states of nature, f2(e); is obtained as the root of the following equation:
1 =
h
(1  e1   e2(1  fee))1  i+ (13)
+f2(e) 1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 +
+2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1  +
+(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+(1  ) 1RHp 1  + 2RMp 1  + (1  1   2)RLp 1  1 +   1 f2(e) :
Appendix A.1 contains the implicit expressions for the remaining value functions, which
depend on the scenario in which the liquidity constraint is binding. We obtain the corre-
sponding fj(e) for each value of e, then nd the optimal portfolio weights that lead to
the maximum fj(e): The numerical strategy that we use to solve the optimization prob-
lem is similar to that employed by Koren and Szeidl (2002). The grid of vectors s rep-
resent di¤erent portfolio weights, so for each candidate portfolio weight e; we solve f2(e);
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which implies that the liquidity constraint is not binding in any of the three scenarios (i.e.,
i = H;M;L). With the value of f2(e), we can verify whether the assumption that the liq-
uidity constraint is not binding in any of the three scenarios holds. We thus test if the
corresponding consumption levels obtained under f2(e) in the three states of nature verify
that CHfoc;2  CHconst;2 \ CMfoc;2  CMconst;2 \ CLfoc;2  CLconst;2: If so, we can conclude that the
true value of f(e) is given by Equation (13), which implicitly determines f2(e). If the con-
dition does not hold though, the true value of f(e) is given by any other functions f(e);
as dened by Equation (12) or the expressions in Equations (A1.1)-(A1.6) in Appendix A.1.
We repeat the analysis for a value of f(e) obtained with Equation (12), f1(e); and test if
the condition CHfoc;2 > C
H
const;2 \ CMfoc;2 > CMconst;2 \ CLfoc;2 > CLconst;2 holds. If the previous
condition is not satised, we repeat the experiment with Equation (A1.1), taking into ac-
count the implicit condition that the corresponding consumption paths must hold, and so
on, successively up to the last value function. Thus, we obtain di¤erent portfolios weights
and determine the corresponding function f(e) for each portfolio weight.14 We nd that
for 99.90% of the portfolio weights, the functions to be employed are either f1(e) or f2(e):
Therefore, in most of the cases, CHfoc;2 > C
H
constr;2 \ CMfoc;2 > CMconstr;2 \ CLfoc;2 > CLconstr;2
or CHfoc;2  CHconst;2 \ CMfoc;2  CMconst;2 \ CLfoc;2  CLconst;2: The di¤erence among the di¤er-
ent scenarios reects the stock returns (H;M;L); in a state of nature, when consumption
(as obtained under the rst-order condition or constraint) is higher than another form of
consumption, this inequality persists for the remaining states of nature.
The next step is to nd the portfolio weights among the set of portfolios dened by the
grid of es that maximizes f(e). The optimal portfolio weight vector is denoted e; and
it gives the value function of the modied problem. After obtaining e and f(e), we can
easily derive the optimal consumption path in the di¤erent liquidity regimes and scenarios.
Thus, the main point of this optimization problem is to maximize the function f(e); which
has been implicitly determined. The advantage of this methodology is the use of numerical
methods to compute the corresponding f(e) for each value of e and thus obtain the optimal
portfolio e. This methodology implies a substantial simplication in comparison with other
numerical methods that rely on iterative procedures to approximate the value function.
3. Calibration
In this section, we provide adequate ground for the values of the benchmark parameters
we use in the portfolio problem optimization. The parameter  is set in agreement with the
values employed in macroeconomic literature, including Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000)
14A detailed review of the di¤erent possibilities appears in Appendix A.1.
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and Asiedu and Villamil (2000), equal to 0.95.
Previous literature has employed a wide variety of values for the relative risk aversion
coe¢ cient. According to Gollier (2001), it seems reasonable to assume a relative risk aversion
coe¢ cient ranging between 1 and 4. We adopt a conservative approach and choose  equal
to 2 for all households in the sample to prevent the results being unduly inuenced by high
risk aversion.
The time interval is one month, which means that an order is executed one month after
it is placed. Although this time interval may be too long, we note that other that for stocks,
it is not particularly high if we consider to the behavior of the rest of the assets, households
e¤orts to rebalance portfolios, and the time spent to do so. According to the model, the time
interval is also the length of the liquidity shock.15 A shorter length may imply a very short
time interval with regard to the illiquidity restrictions on selling the assets and a very short
duration of the e¤ective consumption period.
We assume that the liquidity shocks occur once every four years on average and so, in
annualized terms  = 0.25. We also assume that the size of the shock is equal to 1.18 ( =
1.18), so if liquidity shock exists then consumption during this shock gives the individual
1.4 times more utility than consuming during normal liquidity regimes (i.e., ). To conrm
the suitability of these parameters, we employ implied moments for the growth of nal con-
sumption expenditures of Spanish households. The standard deviation of annual consumption
growth equals 2.79%, in line with the data reported by Campbell (2003) for France (2.9%)
and Germany (2.43%). However, because we assume that portfolio rebalancing takes place
monthly and our benchmark is the standard deviation of quarterly consumption growth equal
to 3.2%, we calibrate  and  to ensure that the standard deviation of the liquidity shock
is compatible with our benchmark and the level of extra utility accords with common sense
(i.e., a liquidity shock increases the utility of consumption, but an increment 100 or 1000
times higher than in periods without shock would conict with common sense; the value
proposed by Koren and Szeidl [2002], where  = 112 = 121; thus seems too high). Setting
 = 0.25 and  = 1.18, the standard deviation of the liquidity shock is 3.25%, which is very
similar to our benchmark value. We use quarterly consumption to calibrate the parameter
; because we lack of monthly consumption data. Moreover, the similar standard deviation
observed in the annual and quarterly consumption growths indicates that the results will
be independent to the use of annual or quarterly consumption, so we can capture patterns
15Koren and Szeidl (2002) recognize that this point seems to create a potential weakness, but if a liquidity
shock has a longer length than the waiting time before the trade takes place, the household can optimally
trade to counteract continuing liquidity shock after the trade is executed. Thus, a longer liquidity shock
should not change the optimal portfolio substantially.
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observed in quarterly consumption that likely would be cancelled out in annual data.16 The
annualized benchmark parameters employed in the analysis are as follows:  = 0;95;  = 2;
t = 1=12;  = 1;18; and  = 0;25:
We employ annual17 historical real returns from 1991 (one year prior to the rst year for
which we have information on homeowners in the EFF) to the date of the survey, or the year
we set as the initial date in the optimization problem (2002 or 2005). Because we consider
three di¤erent scenarios, we must set di¤erent returns for the nancial assets, depending on
the realized scenario. However, the complexity of the model makes it infeasible to associate
three di¤erent scenarios with each of the considered assets. The riskiest asset is stock, so
we include stock returns depending on the state of nature. We further assume that bank
time deposits,18 mortgage, and housing returns are dened by the average of the historical
returns with no volatility, so the stocks are the only assets that pose risk to the households
portfolios.19 Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the historical real returns. The
standard deviation of the stocks is ten times larger than the standard deviation of the other
assets, in support of our assertion that the main source of risk in the asset returns comes
from stocks. Moreover, with the exception of housing,20 these returns o¤er a low correlation
with the stock returns.21 ;22
16According to the low variation in the standard deviation of the annual and quarterly consumption growth,
we use slightly higher and lower values than 3.25%, to acknowledge that the standard deviation of the
monthly consumption may be slightly higher or lower than the previous value. For a standard deviation in
the monthly consumption growth equal to 3%, we nd that the parameter  should be equal to 1.16; for
a standard deviation equal to 3.5%, the same parameter should be equal to 1.20. We thus conrm the low
variation in the parameter  for such levels of volatility. We nd very similar results using any of the three
values for parameter :
17The available data for IBEX35 plus dividends, mortgage, and housing are in annual terms; information
about deposits are monthly. As a robustness test, we estimate the same descriptive statistics in quarterly
terms for housing (using data obtained from the Secretary of State for Housing), deposits, and mortgage,
and we obtaine similar results.
18It is important to note that the deposit does not have any specic maturity.
19Appendix A.2 includes details about the estimation of the housing returns.
20Housing and stocks engage in a negative relationship, such that the bursting of the dot-com bubble in the
early 2000s coincided with the starting point of the process of rapid revalorization in housing prices, which
persisted up to 2008.
21Bank time deposits and mortgages are highly correlated, though that correlation does not generate any
problem with regard to portfolio weights, because for these assets, we assume a constant return through the
states of nature.
22We do not take into account the correlation between housing and stock returns for several reasons. First,
the investment share in housing is not used in the optimization problem, so using three states of nature for
the housing returns would not have any e¤ect on the optimal investment in housing. Second, the optimization
methodology we implement does not include a mean-variance framework in which the covariances or corre-
lations among assets are crucial for determining the optimal shares, because of the potential diversication
or redundancies among the di¤erent assets. Third, the volatility of housing returns is almost seven times
lower than the volatility of stock returns, so the housing returns in the di¤erent scenarios should not change
materially from the average return value. Thus, the results should be similar to those obtained under the
current model specication. Fourth, using the three states of nature in the housing returns determined by
16
<Insert Table 1 here>
Finally, we analyze the e¤ects of changing each of the previously calibrated parameters,
ceteris paribus, on the optimal portfolio shares, and we test the e¤ects of a di¤erent banking
policy in terms of the householdsportfolio composition.
4. Data
The data employed for this study come from the Spanish Survey of Household Finance
(EFF), managed by the Bank of Spain (Spains central bank). This survey gathers data
about the nancial and economic situation of Spanish households in the years 2002 and
2005. The survey also includes detailed information on their assets, liabilities, incomes, use
of nancial services, demographic characteristics, and housing. The EFF also o¤ers certain
retrospective information about housing, such as the year and price of acquisition, and the
amount and conditions related to the mortgage at both the origination and the survey date,
if the mortgage is still in existence. Detailed information about the nancial assets of a given
household also appear in the EFF.
The housing price index came from the Secretary of State for Housing. The variables
related to the interest rates of bank time deposits and EURIBOR were obtained from the
Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Spain. To generalize as much as possible and avoid using
maturities or the particularities of the di¤erent deposits, the bank time deposit interest rate
we use corresponds to the Spanish Federation of Savings Banks (CECA) passive reference
rate. This conservative methodology implies a widely accepted interest rate. The property
tax values were obtained from di¤erent city council web-pages. Appendix A.2 includes a
denition of the variables we constructed, such as housing returns, mortgage payments, the
value of the desired housing, household nancial constraints (wealth and income), the degree
of the households nancial constraints (degree of wealth and degree of income), the degree
of nancial sophistication, and consumption.
We lter the data to detect inappropriate, anomalous, or outlying observations. Because
the analysis is based on portfolio choice restricted to the decision made about housing own-
ership, we discard data from households that rent their house and those that did not pay
market prices but obtained their housing by means of a bequest or legacy. A key variable for
dening borrowing constraints and the portion of wealth invested in housing is the housing
the three states of nature in the stock returns could demand three states of nature in the mortgage returns,
given that the correlation between mortgage and housing returns is close to 0.7. At the end, the states of
nature in the stock returns can determine the remaining returns, so we just pretend to reect the much higher
volatility in the stock returns and consider it the only risky asset, once an investment in housing is made.
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value at the survey moment, as reported by the household. Thus, we eliminate data from
households that bought their housing before 1992. The further from the survey date, the
more subjective is the value that the household reveals. This step also guarantees that any
retrospective imputation used to calculate, for example, the mortgage payment will o¤er at
least minimum reliability. Our model also assumes individuals with innite life spans. For
this reason and to reduce the heterogeneity that could inuence portfolio choices, we discard
data from households in which the head is older than 60 years of age. The households in our
sample dwell in their desired housing, as we noted previously, because we consider housing
a long-run asset whose purchase determines others investments. If we include households in
a house whose value is conspicuously below that of their desired housing, their investments
plans could be inuenced by the desire to change houses, which would shift the main asset
in Spanish householdsportfolios. We estimate the desired house value using Mayordomos
(2008) method and consider housing as the desired one whenever its desired value is below the
housings market price. We also exclude data from households that have undertaken repairs
to their housing that were valued at more than 50,000 Euros, to avoid deviations between
the real housing market value and the subjectively considered value claimed by the house-
holds after the renovations. Moreover, if such a signicant renovation were to take place,
then it would be di¢ cult to assume that the house was the one desired at the moment of the
purchase. Finally, we discard data households that reveal anomalous information.23
To impute any missing data in the survey, we use a multiple imputation procedure. The
EFF user guide indicates that imputations already are provided for any No Answeror Dont
Knowreplies for the variables in the survey, with a few specic exceptions. The use of imputed
values enables an analysis of the data with complete data methods. Multiple imputations
also help mitigate the uncertainty associated with process (Rubin (1987)) and are relevant
for estimating the regressions parameters and calculating descriptive statistics, especially
those related to income and wealth dispersion.24 The households in the EFF have di¤erent
probabilities of entering the sample, so we associate each household with its corresponding
selection weight, to ensure we obtain representative statistics of the population. We use the
weights to calculate the descriptive statistics as well, such that the mean and median are
averages across the corresponding values of the statistics in the ve imputations, and the
variances are obtained according to the user guide indications.25
The nal sample consists of 427 households for the 2002 survey. The EFF reports the
23For example, some households report that the housing value at the survey date, without any renovation,
is more than 50 times the value of the house when they bought it.
24For an introduction to the reasons for the imputation and the choice of the imputation method used, see
Bover (2004); for a detailed description of imputation in the EFF, see Barceló (2005).
25See the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF) 2005 User Guide:
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/e¤/userguide_2005.pdf.
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representativeness (weights) of the households in the Spanish population, so we can translate
this number of households into a value that indicates their representativeness in the total
population. These weights also enable us to construct di¤erent estimates and their variances.
The 427 households thus are representative of 1,249,355 Spanish households. We provide the
main descriptive statistics in Table 2 and dene the variables in Appendix A.2. Housing
accounts for the main portion of householdswealth, and we note the signicant di¤erence
between the purchase value and the value in 2002, which indicates the high appreciation of
the asset and emphasizes the importance of including it as a determinant restriction when
analyzing Spanish householdsportfolios. Regarding contributions to the total net wealth
of di¤erent assets, the data shows the importance of housing; on average, it is 1.282 times
net wealth. Households usually resort to external funding to buy housing, so the rate of the
mortgage over the wealth is 31.9%. The proportion of net wealth invested in deposits is 3.1%,
whereas stocks represent 0.6% of total net wealth. We nd that annual income, annual labour
income, annual consumption, the amount invested in the di¤erent nancial assets, and the
housing purchase price achieve asymmetry.
We also employ the EFF 2005 survey to investigate portfolio rebalancing for a total of
130 households (representative of 390,300 households), for which we have information from
both the 2002 and the 2005 waves. Moreover, we employ 230 households (representative of
714,902 households) from 2002 survey who bought housing between 1997 and 2001, as well
as 323 households (representative of 1,169,080 households) from the 2005 survey who bought
housing between 2000 and 2004. With these samples, we can investigate di¤erences in the
portfolio choice decision that might result from less restrictive banking practices.26
<Insert Table 2 here>
5. Empirical Results
In Table 3, we report the optimal portfolio composition in our baseline situation:
(; ;t; ; ) = (0.95; 2; 1=12; 1.18, 0.25). We estimate the optimal portfolio composi-
tion, household by household, for each imputation, then, aggregate the individual portfolios
for nine categories into which a given household may be classied and that are available in
the EFF: age, education, degree of nancial sophistication, economic sector, labor situation,
26We only present the descriptive statistics for the EFF 2002 survey because these data constitute the
core of this investigation; the EFF 2005 data merely extend our main results of the paper. However, the
descriptive statistics for households in the EFF 2005 survey are available on request.
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sex, household income, net wealth, and type of nancial restrictions.27 Stocks and bank time
deposits o¤er responses to a liquidity shock, which makes them substitutes in terms of their
utility for increasing consumption when a liquidity shock occurs. However, bank time de-
posits also might be considered illiquid assets which may be converted into liquid assets in
exchange for a cancellation fee. The baseline model assigns optimal weights of 1.6%, 4.9%,
and -34.7% to stocks, bank time deposits, and mortgage, respectively; the actual weights
are 0.6%, 3.1%, and -31.9%. The optimal and actual weights are close in absolute terms
but not in relative terms. In relative terms, the optimal investments in stocks, deposits, and
mortgage are 166%, 58%, and 9% higher than the actual investments. Statistical signicance
tests indicate that the optimal investment in stocks and deposits are signicantly higher than
the actual ones Therefore, Spanish households tend to invest less in stocks and deposits than
theory indicate they should.
Next, we analyze the e¤ect of several groups of variables referred to di¤erent households
characteristics on the allocation behavior of the households. Although these variables are
unrelated to the portfolio choice decision model, its use enables us to understand the sources
of heterogeneity in the allocation choices. The investment in stocks also varies considerably
among di¤erent subgroups, such that the optimal proportion varies from 0.2% (households
constrained in wealth or in both wealth and income) to 7.4% (nancially sophisticated house-
holds). In almost all cases the optimal investment is signicantly higher than the actual one.
There are two exceptions: rst, the case of highly nancially sophisticated households whose
optimal investment in stocks is signicantly lower than the actual one. Second, the house-
holds that are constrained in wealth or in both wealth and income whose optimal and actual
investments in stocks are very similar. The model posits a positive and linear relation be-
tween the optimal investment in stocks and particular categories, such as the education level
and household net wealth. This linear relationship also emerges in the actual portfolios. The
higher the education level, the higher the level of stock ownership should be, whereas lower
education levels imply, lower investments in stocks (0.7%); households headed by a person
with a university education should invest the highest proportion (2.3%). This pattern is con-
sistent with the actual investments, though the proportions of 0.1% and 1.2% are well below
the optimal levels, consistent with Haliassos and Bertauts (1995) nding that education is
important for overcoming barriers to stockholding erected by ignorance. Regarding the eco-
nomic sector, the optimal stock proportion for households headed by a person who works
in the primary sector is 0.7%, but it is equals 1.6% and 1.7% for households headed by
someone in the secondary and tertiary sectors, respectively. In the actual weights, we observe
27Appendix A.2 contains denitions of the degree of nancial sophistication and the type of nancial
restriction.
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di¤erences between the primary (0.1%) and secondary and tertiary (0.6%) sectors that are
broadly consistent with the optimal pattern. The net wealth variable has an increasing e¤ect,
from an optimal investment of 0.5% for the households with the lowest net wealth to 4.2%
for the households with the highest net wealth. Again the same pattern, though with lower
proportions, appears in the EFF data (actual proportions range from 0.2% to 2.3%). As
documented by Campbell (2006), Carroll (2002), and King and Leape (1998), wealthy house-
holds are willing to take greater risk in their portfolios. We similarly nd greater participation
in risky asset classes by wealthy households.
For groups dened by age, degree of nancial sophistication, or household income, the
model instead predict a non-linear relationship with stock investment. In the case of age, the
optimal maximum investment in stocks should be by households headed by a person between
the ages of 45 and 55 years (3.2%), and decreasing in the following age group. This results is
not consistent with the actual data, which shows a linear relationship between stock ownership
and age, such that the highest investment in stocks is by the group older than 55 years
(1.9%). For the degree of nancial sophistication, the model posits maximum investments
by highly sophisticated households (7.4%) and minimum investments by investors with an
average level of sophistication (1.4%). Again the actual data disagrees with the optimal
choice; we nd a linear, positive relationship between stock ownership and degree of nancial
sophistication, such that higher sophistication means, higher investments in stocks. With
regards to household income, the model posits a non-linear relationship, starting with an
investment of 1.5% by the group of households that earn less than 20,000e, then a decrease
for groups earning 20,000e - 40,000e or 40,000e - 60,000e (minimum investment, 1.1%).
Finally, the model predicts an increase for the group that earns more than 60,000e (3.4%).
In the actual data though, there is a linear and positive relationship between stock ownership
and household income. The remarkable non-linear patterns observed for di¤erent groups and
assets mainly reect the non-linear pattern of housing shares across these groups (e.g., degree
of nancial sophistication category). Moreover, for the cases that reveal a linear pattern in
housing shares and a non-linear pattern for a given asset for a given group or category, the
di¤erences within each group and asset are low, considering the levels of the investment shares
in absolute terms.
The gender of the head of the household has no signicant e¤ect, in either the model or the
actual data. However, the theoretical investment weights (1.5 - 1.6%) again are signicantly
higher than the observed (0.5 - 0.6%). For the labor situation, the theoretical pattern and
the actual one are broadly consistent. The highest investment comes from the retired group,
and the lowest is associated with the self-employed group. Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2001)
obtain similar results for U.S. data. This result likely reects the idea that investing in ones
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own business makes a household reluctant its risk exposure any further.
The investment in bank time deposits does not exhibit a clear pattern across di¤erent
categories and also reveals much lower variation than stocks. However, in almost all cases
the optimal investment in deposits is signicantly higher than the actual one. There are two
exceptions: rst, the case of highly nancially sophisticated households whose optimal invest-
ment in deposits is signicantly lower than the actual one. Second, the cases of households
with income higher than 60000e; or net wealth higher than 300000e; or without nancial
constraints, whose optimal and actual investments in deposits are very similar. The propor-
tion invested in bank time deposits varies from 2.4% (head of household is retired) to 5.7%
(head of household employed in the primary sector). In some cases, there is a negative rela-
tion between the optimal investment in bank time deposits and some demographic categories,
such as age and economic sector. That is, the optimal proportion in bank time deposits for
the youngest households and households headed by a person who works in the primary sector
are 5.2% and 5.7%, respectively, but these values equal to 4.5% and 4.7% for the oldest
households and households that belong to the tertiary sector.
The actual proportions are almost constant with age (with a decrease in the 35 - 55 years
age group) and non-linear with the sector. Household income and net wealth indicate a non-
linear z-shape in their optimal weights, in contrast with the v-shaped pattern observed in
actual data. According to the labor situation, households headed by a retired person should
invest the lowest proportion in bank time deposits (2.4%), and the highest proportion of
investment should align with self-employed households (5.5%). This behavior is mirrored
in the actual weights: 1.9% and 4.6%, respectively. The optimal amount to be invested
depending on gender is similar between men and women (5% and 4.6%, respectively) and
comparable to the actual weights (3.2% and 3%). Households unconstrained by either income
or wealth should invest less than households with any type of constraint. On the contrary, the
actual proportions show that unconstrained households invest the highest proportion (4.4%)
in this category.
Mortgage and housing are closely interconnected, such that the lower the proportion of
housing, the lower the proportion of mortgage. Recall that we consider the investment in
housing an already committed investment; we optimize the weight of the mortgage in the
household portfolio, conditional on the investment in housing. The overall pattern of the
theoretical portfolio weights and the actual weights are pretty similar across groups, with
the exception of the net wealth variable. The proportion (optimal and actual) of housing and
mortgage decreases with the age and education. We also may observe a v-shaped pattern in
both optimal and actual weights relative to the degree of sophistication, economic sector, and
household income categories. The optimal mortgage proportions decrease with net wealth,
22
whereas in the actual proportions, we nd an initial decrease, followed by an increase among
the wealthiest group, which is somewhat surprising. However , in almost all cases, the optimal
and actual proportions invested in mortgages are statistically indistinguishable.
Regarding employment, the model predicts that retired households should have the lowest
levels of mortgage (-7.3%) and housing (100.8%), because older households should have
paid for most of their housing, as is consistent with the actual weights (-4.1% and 100.8%,
respectively). Men should have higher mortgage levels than women (-35.5% and -32.7%,
respectively), partially because housing represents a higher proportion of their net wealth
(129% and 126.5%, respectively). We observe the same behavior in the actual weights with
proportions of -32.6% and -30.2% for men and women, respectively. The constraint in wealth
is the dominant constraint in this setting. Thus, we nd similar proportions in housing and
mortgage for households constrained in their wealth (-74.6%) and also for those constrained
in both their wealth and income (-75.3%). These proportions are much higher than the
optimal weight for households constrained in income (-35.2%). The proportions of housing
and mortgage relative to net wealth for unconstrained households show the lowest values (-
21.5%). In the actual proportions, we observe very close values to the optimal ones. Signicant
di¤erences between the optimal and the actual investment in mortgages are only found in
the case of highly nancially sophisticated households (the observed mortgage is signicantly
higher than the optimal one) and the individuals more than 55 years old or retired (the
observed mortgage is signicantly lower than the optimal one).
<Insert Table 3 here>
From these optimal and actual portfolios in 2002, we extend the analysis using the EFF
2005 survey. We study the portfolio rebalancing, from 2002 to 2005, for a total of 130 house-
holds for which we have information from both surveys. Table 4 reports the di¤erence between
the optimal portfolio for the baseline optimization problem and the actual portfolio, accord-
ing to the EFF information for the 2002 and 2005 surveys for seven subgroups.28 Because we
still assume that housing value is given by households decision, there is no di¤erence between
the optimal and the observed housing value relative to wealth. On average, households un-
derinvest in stocks and bank time deposits. The under-investment is similar in both surveys
(1.3%) for stocks, but decreases for deposits from 1.7% to 1.2%.
We nd signicant under-investment in stocks in 2002 and 2005 in almost all the categories
across the di¤erent groups with few exceptions. Regarding bank time deposits, we again
28Note that we are considering 130 households instead of the 427 households that composed the 2002 wave
so Tables 3 and 4 resultsfor the year 2002 are not strictly comparable.
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observe that most categories of households, across subgroups and surveys, tend to signicantly
underinvest. Finally, there is scarce di¤erence between observed and optimal investment in
mortgages for almost all categories and all the di¤erent groups.29
<Insert Table 4 here>
Then, we employ 230 households that bought the housing between 1997 and 2001 and
323 households that bought the housing between 2000 and 2004 to investigate the di¤erences
in the portfolio choices derived from supposedly less restrictive banking practices. According
to the optimal portfolios for these households, as we report in Table 5 the average optimal
investment in mortgages is slightly higher in 2005 than in 2002 (-54.1% and -49.3%, respec-
tively), perhaps due to the increase in housing prices and somewhat less restrictive banking
practices. The optimal investment in bank deposits is similar in 2002 (5%) and 2005 (5.2%),
but the optimal investment in stocks in 2005 (1.6%) is more than 70% higher than in 2002
(0.9%).
For all the categories in each subgroup, we observe that the optimal investment in mort-
gages is higher in 2005 than in 2002, again due to the increase in housing prices and the
higher loan-to-value ratio. There are some exceptions though, such as categories in which
the optimal investment in mortgages is higher than it was in 2002, including the households
headed by someone who works in the primary sector, the self-employed, less sophisticated
households, and those with net wealth higher than 300,000e. These exceptions are mainly
due to the higher weight devoted to housing investments in 2002 than in 2005.
The optimal investment in stocks increases in 2005 relative to 2002 in some categories: the
oldest households, with the highest income and net wealth, and unconstrained households.
However, we observe the opposite pattern among highly sophisticated households.
Finally, the optimal investment in bank time deposits presents a lower variation from
2002 and 2005 relative to other nancial assets. The most signicant di¤erence appears for
households with higher net wealth, whose optimal level of investment in 2002 is 1.9% higher
than in 2005. For this reason, the optimal investment level in stocks is 1.8% higher in 2005
than in 2002. In the remaining categories, the level of the di¤erence between shares in 2002
and 2005 is rarely higher than 1% in absolute terms. The overall impression is that the
portfolios structure has barely changed from 2002 to 2005.
<Insert Table 5 here>
29Because the mortgage shares are negative, the signs should be interpreted in the opposite way: when the
di¤erence between the optimal and the observed portfolio is negative, it implies an underinvestment.
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6. Comparative statics analysis
This section presents a comparative statics analysis based on alternative values for the
main calibrated parameters (; ; ;t) and for our assumptions about banking practices,
in terms of the amount of wealth and income required for households to receive a mortgage.
We report the results in Table 6. Regarding the parameter , we explained in Section 2 the
calibration procedure and why 0.95 provides a benchmark value; here we employ two discount
factors, 0.975 and 0.99. By increasing the discount factor, we decrease the penalty for delaying
consumption. The proportion invested in stocks slightly decreases with the discount factor,
and with a higher discount factor, the proportion invested in deposits declines. Because
larger s imply more concern about the future, households should be willing to decrease
their investments in stocks and deposits, as well as their leverage, when  varies from the
baseline.
In Table 6, we also report the comparative statics related to the size of the/liquidity
shock (). The baseline is 1.18, and the alternatives for the parameter  are 1.1 and 1.5. The
higher the taste shock, the higher is the proportion of investments in deposits, likely because
a larger taste shock increases the deposits utility, so households prefer to maintain larger
proportions of risk-freeassets to avoid the possible losses to stock investments, were the
scenario to turn unfavorable. The investment in stocks does not change across the di¤erent
sizes of the taste/liquidity shock. As the size of the shock increases, the mortgage share also
increases. The mortgage could even be used as an additional source of liquidity to obtain
cash that could be invested in deposits.
In the baseline scenario, we calibrate the parameter  such that it is equal to 0.25,
which means that there is a liquidity shock every four years. We set other values for this
parameter (0.15, 0.35) and nd that, similarly to the outcomes for the parameter , the
higher the probability of a liquidity shock, the higher is the proportion invested in deposits.
The intuition also remains the same: both parameters are related to the liquidity shock, so
the more probable the taste shock, the larger the proportions of risk-freeassets households
maintain to avoid possible losses due to an unfavorable stock scenario. The optimal share
to be invested in stocks thus slightly decreases as the parameter  increases. As occurs with
the optimal investment in the mortgage when we analyze variations in parameter , the
higher the probability of a shock, the higher is the optimal investment. This result stresses
the role of the mortgage as a source of liquidity that gets invested in deposits whenever the
loan-to-value ratio is below 0.8.
The length of the liquidity shock (t) is one month in the baseline case, but for longer
periods, the proportion invested in stocks increases, and the proportion invested in deposits
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decreases. As the shock duration increases, households prefer to invest in assets with more risk
but also higher expected returns. The mortgage share also decreases as the shock duration
increases.
Finally, we evaluate the e¤ect of bank practices (restrictions ix and x in Equation (1))
on the portfolio composition and mortgage demand in Spain. Mayordomo (2008) analyzes
changes in banking sector practices related to the mortgage-granting process and nds that if
mortgages increased to constitute more than the 80% of housing value, housing demand would
increase considerably. However, other changes in these practices, such as income requirements
or variations in the mortgage interest rate, have a lower impact. Therefore, we estimate how
householdswould change if the nancial institutions obey the mortgage policy recommended
by the regulator.
That is, we restrict the maximum loan-to-value ratio to 70%, and we thus nd that opti-
mization is not possible for some households, namely those whose mortgage loan value exceeds
that gure. If the loan-to-value ratio decreases to 70%, some households thus could not have
become homeowners. When these households disappear from the optimization problem, the
share of housing decreases. In contrast, when the maximum loan-to-value ratio increases to
90%, some households for which the optimization problem could not be solved because their
mortgage loan value exceeded 80% enter the analysis, which increases the overall housing
share. Moreover, this less restrictive banking policy increases the weight of the mortgage in
the householdsportfolios. However, the optimal share of stocks and deposits does not change
materially for the di¤erent loan-to-value ratios.
Change in the income requirements for mortgage payments thus does not cause material
variations in the optimal portfolio composition, in line with Mayordomos (2008) nding that
income requirements have a negligible impact on a households housing purchase decision.
We extend this result to other nancial assets in the household portfolio.
<Insert Table 6 here>
7. Household characteristics and deviations from the
optimal portfolio
In this section we analyze the factors that determine the under- or over-investments
relative to the optimal benchmark. We are conscious that the e¤ects of these factors de-
pend on the optimization methodology and the assumptions employed to obtain the optimal
benchmark. Nevertheless, these results complement the ones reported in Table 4 and could
contribute to a better design and implementation of nancial education programs that may
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help households with certain characteristics to achieve e¤ectively more optimal investments.
To analyze the e¤ect of householdsdemographic characteristics on their deviation from the
optimal investment, we need individual optimal portfolios for the di¤erent households in
the sample. We calculate the di¤erence between the observed investment and the optimal
portfolio for each household in the ve imputations of the EFF. This deviation dened in
percentages, then serves as the dependent variable in a regression in which the explanatory
variables reect di¤erent householdscharacteristics. To distinguish between over- and under-
investments in each asset, we redene the dependent variable. The over-investment in a given
asset is dened as the maximum of zero or the di¤erence between the observed and optimal
investment in a given asset: max (0, observed optimal investment in asset X). We dene the
under-investment as  1 times the minimum of zero or the di¤erence between the observed
and the optimal investment in a given asset: - min (0, observed optimal investment in asset
X).30 We employ the same explanatory variables we used to classify households in Table 3:
logarithm of net wealth, logarithm of household income, age, sex, education, labor situation
of the head of household, economic sector of employment, degree of nancial sophistication,
degree of wealth nancial constraints, degree of income nancial constraints, and year of
housing purchase. Moreover, we add two variables: the di¤erence between the logarithm of
the desired housing value and the logarithm of the actual housing value, and the year of
housing purchase, employed in this case to control for the e¤ect of current banking practices
on the portfolio choice decision.
To analyze the determinants of the deviations from the optimal investment, we employ a
cross-section of households (EFF 2002 survey) and estimate the e¤ect of these determinants
using a bootstrapped truncated ordinary least squares regression with standard errors that is
robust to heteroskedasticity.31 We repeat the same regression for the ve imputations of the
EFF, such that the coe¢ cient for a given variable is the average of the ve coe¢ cients gath-
ered from the di¤erent imputations. To compute the standard errors, we use the instructions
described in the user guide of the EFF.32 The regression is truncated such that the upper
(lower) limit for the over- and under-deviations from the optimal investment in stocks and
30Note that mortgage share has a negative sign. Therefore, when we study the over-/under-investment in
this asset, we change the sign of the observed and optimal investment shares and proceed, as with the other
assets, to dene the over-/under-investment value.
31We employ the bootstrap method to avoid any bias in the standard errors due to generated regressors.
32To make inferences from the ve multiple imputed data sets, we rst must analyze each set using complete
data methods, then combine the results. To obtain a point estimate of some parameter (e.g., mean, median,
regression parameter), we can use the average of the ve estimates obtained in each of the ve imputations
that form the survey. The variance associated with this estimate has two components: the within-imputation
sampling variance, which is the average of the ve variance estimates, and the between-imputations variance,
which reects variability due to imputation uncertainty and is the variance of the complete data point
estimates. The total variance for the estimate is the sum of the within-imputation sampling variance and 6/5
times the between-imputations variance.
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deposits is 100% (0%). The upper (lower) limit for the over- and under-deviations from the
optimal investment in a mortgage is 80% (0%), which is consistent with banking practices
(i.e., maximum loan-to-value ratio is 80% of housing value).
We report the estimated e¤ects for the di¤erent nancial instruments from the previous
sections in Table 7. In Panel A, we provide the determinants of the deviations from the optimal
investment in stocks. The rst column contains the determinants of the over-investment in
stocks; the second one reports the determinants of the under-investment. The only signicant
deviations from the optimal portfolio are due to under-investments, which are signicant in
rich and old households, households whose desired housing value is high relative to their
current housing value, nancially less sophisticated households, and households that su¤er
high nancial constraints in their wealth. As Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2006) suggests,
this result may imply that less sophisticated households fail to invest in stocks or invest
cautiously because they are aware that they lack the skills to invest e¢ ciently. Rich and old
households should invest more in stocks but are very conservative. Finally, households whose
ideal housing is more expensive than that which they own and those that are nancially
constrained in their wealth are more willing to save than invest in risky assets. In general,
all these households can be considered conservative, because stocks are the only risky asset
included in the optimization problem.
In Panel B of Table 7, we provide the results for the analysis of deviations from the
optimal investment in deposits. Unlike our ndings for stocks, we observe that nancial
and demographic characteristics a¤ect not only under-investments but also over-investments
signicantly. Nearly all the characteristics that caused signicant under-investments on stocks
also cause over-investments in deposits. The richer and older households, those for which the
value of the desired housing is high relative to their current housing value, and households that
are nancially less sophisticated tend to be very conservative. They under-invest in stocks
and over-invest in deposits. Unemployed households also tend to over-invest in deposits,
likely because their labor situation and potential need for cash in the short run, in case of a
liquidity shock, leaves them unable to rely on labor income to face such shocks. Households
that bought their housing in years close to the survey date also tend to over-invest in deposits.
The housing purchase implies a signicant investment, so these households prefer to invest
in liquid assets. However, our nding that highly nancially sophisticated households deviate
from the optimum, by over-investing in deposits, seems more surprising. Although they invest
the right proportion in the risky asset, they tend to over-invest in the non-risky asset. Some
other nancial and demographic variables also a¤ect the existence of under-investments.
Specically, households with a high income, those in which the head of household is a man,
and households that are nancially constrained in income tend to under-invest in deposits
28
with respect to the optimum.
For completeness, although there is no signicant di¤erence in the aggregate optimal
and actual investments in mortgage, in Panel C of Table 7, we show the determinants of the
deviations from the optimal investment in the mortgage. Some householdscharacteristics
lead to a signicant over-investment in their mortgage, such as a high di¤erence between the
desired and the real housing value, a high degree of nancial sophistication, and a recent
purchase of housing. Similar to the results in Panel B of Table 7, some of these character-
istics have positive e¤ects on a potential over-investment in deposits. If households desire a
house much more expensive than their current one, they likely over-invest in their mortgage
while also saving money in deposits, which they can later use to buy their preferred house.
Surprisingly, the highly sophisticated households over-invest in their mortgage, perhaps sim-
ply because these households tend to live in expensive houses (the correlation between the
high sophistication dummy and the housing price is close to 0.3) and prefer a mortgage with
an excessive loan-to-value ratio, such that they have some extra liquidity to face potential
liquidity shocks. This extra liquidity could be reected in an over-investment in deposits.
The over-investment observed among the households that have bought their house recently
could reect banking practices in Spain. Around 2002, the year of the survey, the portion
of the housing value able to be nanced by a mortgage increased to more than 80% and
grew signicantly higher than in preceding years. The result therefore implicitly reects the
increase in the mortgage loan-to-value ratio over time. Households with a high income have a
smaller mortgage than its optimal value; this income e¤ect also emerges for households with
nancial constraints, which tend to under-invest in their mortgage. Also, households head-
ed by men tend to under-invest in mortgages. Most households that under-invest in their
mortgage also under invest in deposits, which is consistent with households employing their
savings in deposits to pay for their mortgage.
< Insert Table 7 here>
8. Conclusions
Housing represents almost 70% of householdsportfolio value in most countries. To model
optimal portfolio choices, two approaches can be followed. On the one hand one may include
housing as an additional asset in the standard portfolio choice problem. On the other, one
may consider housing as the primary asset that determines the composition of the rest of the
portfolio. In the latter case, the housing investment represents a decision already made by
households, so estimates of the optimal portfolio must be conditional on the housing value.
We adopt the latter approach in this paper.
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In the theoretical part of the paper, we present an optimization problem with four dif-
ferent nancial assets: stocks, deposits, mortgage, and housing. We apply this model in the
empirical section to micro data from the Bank of Spains EFF. We present estimates of op-
timal portfolios for di¤erent individual households and for di¤erent groups of households,
dened according to their demographic characteristics. Finally, after having estimated the
optimal portfolio, we compare it with the actual portfolio and study the factors a¤ecting the
deviations between both portfolios.
Our baseline results show that, given the actual proportion invested on average by Span-
ish households in housing, they invest signicantly less in stocks and deposits than theory
indicate they should. The optimal investment in mortgage is higher than the observed one but
the di¤erence between them is not statistically signicant. We also nd a positive relation-
ship between the optimal proportion invested in stocks and the householdsage, education
level, degree of nancial sophistication, income, and net wealth. The proportion of housing
decreases with age, education level, and household net wealth. The optimal mortgage also
depends on the housing investment. Finally, the optimal amount to be invested in bank time
deposits is around 4-5% and nearly constant across demographics groups
From our study of portfolio rebalancing from 2002 to 2005, we nd that on average,
households under-invest in stocks in similar proportions in 2002 and 2005 and slightly less so
in deposits. Actual investment in mortgage is similar in both periods and very close to the
optimal one.
Finally, the deviation of householdsinvestment in stocks from the optimal value depends
signicantly on their net wealth, the di¤erence between the desired housing value and the
actual housing value, the age of the reference person, the degree of nancial sophistication,
and the degree of wealth nancial constraints. These factors all lead to signicant under-
investments. The deviation in the case of deposits is mainly due to net wealth, di¤erences
between the desired housing value and the actual housing value, age, unemployment, degree
of nancial sophistication, and year of housing purchase, which prompt over-investments.
The households income, the sex of the head of household, and the degree of income nancial
constraints are the main determinants of under-investments in deposits.
This study also leaves several interesting directions for further extensions. On the theo-
retical side, it would be interesting to include more assets in the optimization procedure, as
well as specic tax e¤ects. From a substantive, empirical perspective, it would be interesting
to analyze portfolio rebalancing in the context of the current global nancial crisis.
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Appendix A.1. Consumption Schedules and Implicit Expression
of Value Functions
In this appendix, we dene the di¤erent consumption schedules and the corresponding
implicit expression of the value functions, fi(e) for i = 3; :::; 8; depending on the liquidity
shock realization and the state of nature:33
If ((CHfoc;2 > C
H
constr;2) and (C
M
foc;2 > C
M
constr;2) and (C
L
foc;2 > C
L
constr;2)); then f(e) =
f1(e):
Ciconstr;2 = (1 + 2(1  fee) + rip)W + L for i = H;M;L: (A1.a)
If ((CHfoc;2 6 CHconstr;2) and (CMfoc;2 6 CMconstr;2) and (CLfoc;2 6 CLconstr;2)); then f(e) =
f2(e):
Cifoc;2 =
h
f2(e)( 1 )(RipW + L)i =(1 +   1 f2(e)) for i = H;M;L: (A1.b)
If ((CHfoc;2 > C
H
constr;2) and (C
M
foc;2 > C
M
constr;2) and (C
L;3
foc;2 6 CLconstr;2)); then f(e) =
f3(e):
1 =
h
(1  e1   e2(1  fee))1  (+ (1  )(1 + 2))i+ (A1.1)
+f3(e) 1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 +
+2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1  +
(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+
+f3(e)(1  ) 1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 +
+2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+(1  )(1  1   2)RLp 1 

1 + 
 1
 f3(e) :
CL;3foc;2 =
h
f3(e)( 1 )(RLpW + L)i =(1 +   1 f3(e)); (A1.c)
Ciconstr;2 = (1 + 2(1  fee) + rip)W + L for i = H;M:
33The value function f(e) should be obtained as the root of the corresponding equations.
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If ((CHfoc;2 > C
H
constr;2) and (C
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+(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+(1  )2RMp 1 

1 + 
 1
 f4(e) :
CM;4foc;2 =
h
f4(e)( 1 )(RMp W + L)i =(1 +   1 f4(e)); (A1.d)
Ciconstr;2 = (1 + 2(1  fee) + rip)W + L for i = H;L:
If ((CH;5foc;2 6 CHconstr;2) and (CMfoc;2 > CMconstr;2) and (CLfoc;2 > CLconstr;2)); then f(e) =
f5(e):
1 =
h
(1  e1   e2(1  fee))1  (+ (1  )(2 + (1  1   2)))i+
+f5(e) 1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 + (A1.3)
+2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1  +
+(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+
+f5(e)(1  ) 2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1 +
+(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+(1  )1RMp 1 

1 + 
 1
 f5(e) :
CH;5foc;2 =
h
f5(e)( 1 )(RHp W + L)i =(1 +   1 f5(e)); (A1.e)
Ciconstr;2 = (1 + 2(1  fee) + rip)W + L for i =M;L:
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If ((CHfoc;2 > C
H
constr;2) and (C
M;6
foc;2 6 CMconstr;2) and (C
L;6
foc;2 6 CLconstr;2)); then f(e) =
f6(e):
1 =
h
(1  e1   e2(1  fee))1  (+ (1  )1)i+ (A1.4)
+f6(e)  1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 +
+2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1  +
+(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+(1  )1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+(1  ) 2RMp 1  + (1  1   2)RLp 1  1 +   1 f6(e) :
Ci;6foc;2 =
h
f6(e)( 1 )(RipW + L)i =(1 +   1 f6(e)) for i =M;L;
CHconstr;2 = (1 + 2(1  fee) + rHp )W + L. (A1.f)
If ((CH;7foc;2 6 CHconstr;2) and (CMfoc;2 > CMconstr;2) and (C
L;7
foc;2 6 CLconstr;2)); then f(e) =
f7(e):
1 =
h
(1  e1   e2(1  fee))1  (+ (1  )2)i+ (A1.5)
+f7(e)  1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 +
+2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1  +
+(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+
+(1  )2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+(1  ) 1RHp 1  + (1  1   2)RLp 1  1 +   1 f7(e) :
Ci;7foc;2 =
h
f7(e)( 1 )(RipW + L)i =(1 +   1 f7(e)) for i = H;L;
CMconstr;2 = (1 + 2(1  fee) + rMp )W + L. (A1.g)
If ((CH;8foc;2 6 CHconstr;2) and (C
M;8
foc;2 6 CMconstr;2) and (CLfoc;2 > CLconstr;2)); then f(e) =
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f8(e):
1 =
h
(1  e1   e2(1  fee))1  (+ (1  )(1  1   2))i+ (A1.6)
+f8(e)  1(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rHp   e2r2 + LW )1 +
+2(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rMp   e2r2 + LW )1  +
+(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+
+(1  )(1  1   2)(e1 + e2(1  fee) + rLp   e2r2 + LW )1 

+(1  ) 1RHp 1  + 2RMp 1  1 +   1 f8(e) :
Ci;8foc;2 =
h
f8(e)( 1 )(RipW + L)i =(1 +   1 f8(e)) for i = H;M;
CLconstr;2 = (1 + 2(1  fee) + rLp )W + L. (A1.h)
Ultimate consumption is determined by the grid of es that maximizes f(e). When we
have maximized f(e), we can easily derive the optimal consumption path in the di¤erent
liquidity regimes and scenarios.
Appendix A.2. Denition of Variables
A.2.1. Housing returns
The estimation of the housing returns is based on the estimation of the user cost of home-
owners provided by Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008). The housing returns can be dened as:
hrit =
qit(1   + )  qit 1 + rentit
qit 1
; (A2.1)
where hri;t represents the housing returns per square meter for a given household i at period
t, and qi;t and qi;t 1 are the housing prices per square meter at periods t and t   1, respec-
tively. The parameter  represents housings rate of depreciation, which is set to 0.043.34 The
parameters  is the property tax, equal to 0.0068.35 Finally, rentit reects the income that
the household would have received if it had rented the housing, estimated as:
34Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) base their rate estimates on information from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
35The property tax is called Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (IBI), and in Spain, it comes into e¤ect
at a local jurisdiction level, such that it varies across localities. We employ an average value that reects the
IBI for Madrid and Barcelona.
34
rentrit = (r
d
t + )qit 1 + qit; (A2.2)
where rdt is the EURIBOR rate after taxes in year t.
36
Flavin and Yamashita (2002) also obtain average annual housing returns as average re-
turns across all homeownersreturns. To estimate returns on housing, they use data from the
19681992 waves of the PSID, using the return on owner-occupied housing at the household
level.37
A.2.2. Mortgage Payments
The annual payments were obtained from the remaining amount of the loan principal at
the survey year (2002), according to a French amortization system and using either xed or
variable interest rates, depending on the loans characteristics.
A.2.3. Value of the desired housing
The estimation of the value of the desired housing follows Linneman and Wachter (1989)
and Zorn (1989). To estimate the desired value, we employ a subsample formed by (i) nan-
cially unconstrained households, (ii) households in which the head of household is between
25 and 60 years old, and (iii) households that bought their housing within the previous ve
years; thus, we avoid subjective revelations about the housing price that might deviate from
the real value. The equation estimated with this sample allows us to infer or predict the
desired value for a wider sample of households that includes constrained members. Thus, it
is equivalent to estimating the housing demand in the absence of nancial constraints.
The nal sample comprises 399 households. We employ a generalized Tobit model to
estimate the desired value. The censure is set according to the following expression:
Vi  Zi; (A2.3)
where Vi is the housing purchase price, and Zi  mn( NWi1  0.8 ; 0.33Yir0.8 ) is the minimum of the
limit values set when a household is constrained in wealth or rent, equivalent to constraints
(ix) and (x) in Equation (1).
Thus, under the Tobit specication, we regress the housing purchase price on a group of
variables whose values correspond with the year the housing was bought: permanent income,
net wealth, the user cost of the housing, age, and di¤erent demographic characteristics of the
36The use of the EURIBOR rate in this expression reects the assumption that this rate coincides with
the average market return.
37The construction of housing returns from micro data based on households subjective housing value
measures may not be addeaquate. However, Skinner (1994) compares the annual rate of self-reported price
changes with objective Commerce Department measures and nds that the house price changes over the 1970
and 1980 observed in the two series are very close.
35
head of the household. The estimated coe¢ cients enable us to predict the desired value by a
wider sample of households.
A.2.4. Household nancial constraints
A.2.4.1. Wealth
We dene a limit value (V Wi ) that indicates if a given household i is constrained or
unconstrained in wealth as:
V Wi =
NWi
1  0.8 ; (A2.4)
where NWi is household i0s net wealth the year the housing was bought. The limit value
V Wi is related to the restriction (ix) in Section 2, which reects good banking practices and
implies that the initial payment for the housing purchase must be at least 20% of the housing
price. For this reason, the value 0.8 is the maximum portion of the mortgage with respect to
the housing purchase price that banks o¤er borrowers.
We consider a given household i constrained in wealth whenever the desired housing value
is higher than the value limit V Wi :
A.2.4.2. Income
We dene a limit value (V Yi ) that indicates if a given household i is constrained or
unconstrained in income as:
V Yi =
0.33Yi
r0.8
; (A2.5)
where Yi is household is total annual income the year it bought housing, and r is the mortgage
rate. The limit value V Yi relates to restriction (x) in Section 2, which implies that mortgage
payments must be lower than 33% of household income. For this reason, the value 0.33
reects the maximum portion of the mortgage payment with respect to household income.
We consider a given household i constrained in income whenever the desired housing value
is higher than the value limit V Yi :
A.2.5. Grade of household nancial constraints
Alternatively, we can employ the ratio between the desired housing value and the value
limits as a continuous indicator of these restrictions. This indicator reveals the importance
of the desired value with respect to each of the two value limits. Thus, if the ratio is higher
than 1 for a given household, that household is nancially constrained. The higher the ratio,
the higher is the grade of the restriction.
A.2.5.1. Grade of wealth nancial constraints
This value is the ratio between the desired housing value and the wealth value limit V Wi :
A.2.5.2. Grade of income nancial constraints
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This value is the ratio between the desired housing value and the income value limit V Yi :
A.2.6. Grade of nancial sophistication
To construct a proxy of the nancial knowledge of a given household, we employ infor-
mation that appears in the EFF. Specically, we consider seven di¤erent groups of nancial
instruments or actions that may indicate strong nancial knowledge: realization of electronic
payments; investment in options, futures, swaps or other derivatives; use of credit cards; use
of checks; use of direct billing or direct deposit; use of telephone banking; and use of Internet
banking. For a given household, each action equals 1 if the household uses it and 0 otherwise.
We consider a household less sophisticated when the sum of these values is less than 3. A
household is a midly sophisticated investor if the sum of these values is between 4 and 5,
inclusive. Finally, a given household is highly sophisticated if the sum is 6 or 7.
A.2.7. Consumption
The consumption variable represents householdsexpenditures, including food, but ex-
cluding durable goods (e.g., cars, electrical appliance, ...), housing rentals or other property
costs, mortgage payments, insurance, housing alterations, and housing maintenance costs.
37
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  Table 1: Asset Returns. Descriptive Statistics (%) 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the historical real asset returns. The statistics are 
calculated using data from 1991 to 2002. Panel A reports the expectation (E(ri)) and the 
standard deviation (SD(ri)) of the annual asset’s returns which are deflated by the appropriate 
price index. For the stocks, we present the average returns under a favorable (rH); an 
intermediate (rM), and an unfavorable scenario (rL). Panel B reports the correlations for the 
different pairs of asset’s returns. 
L M H
E[R] -13.87 16.86 37.77 1.15 3.66 4.53
SD[R] 1.11 4.32 2.18
Bank Time 
Deposits Housing Mortgage
Stocks
Bank Time Deposits 1
Housing -0.631 1
Mortgage 0.971 -0.673 1
Housing Mortgage
0.204
Stocks
1
0.217
-0.715
Stocks
28.96
Correlation Matrix
Bank Time 
Deposits
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  Table 2: Households Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the some descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) 
referred to the households' demographic characteristics, financial assets and housing. The 
statistics refer to the EFF 2002 survey wave. 
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Age of the head of household 39.979 38.000 8.897
Head of household has primary education (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.374 0.000 0.484
Head of household has secondary education (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.378 0.000 0.485
Head of household has university education (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.248 0.000 0.432
Less sophisticated investor (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.166 0.000 0.372
Midly sophisticated investor (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.832 1.000 0.374
Highly sophisticated investors (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.002 0.000 0.039
Head of household works in the primary sector (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.058 0.000 0.234
Head of household works in the secondary sector (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.292 0.000 0.455
Head of household works in the tertiary sector (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.606 1.000 0.489
Head of household is employed (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.687 1.000 0.464
Head of household is self-employed (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.124 0.000 0.329
Head of household is retired (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.013 0.000 0.115
Head of household is unemployed or non-active (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.186 0.000 0.389
Sex of the head of household (1 if men, 0 women) 0.702 1.000 0.457
Annual Income (€) 38,693 29,916 33,509
Annual Labor Income (€) 32,208 26,728 25,230
Annual Consumption (€) 12,302 10,800 7,813
Net Wealth (€) 159,542 131,460 108,845
Stocks (€) 902 0 16,073
Deposits (€) 5,035 2,151 11,254
Mortgage (€) -50,948 -25,139 33,702
Housing (€) 204,552 153,193 100,586
Portion of net wealth invested in stocks (%) 0.006 0.000 0.026
Portion of net wealth invested in deposits (%) 0.031 0.016 0.048
Portion of net wealth invested in mortgage (%) -0.319 -0.191 0.381
Portion of net wealth invested in housing (%) 1.282 1.165 0.386
Housing purchase price (€) 90,741 83,440 60,755
Year of housing purchase 1,997 1,997 2.497
Household constrained in wealth (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.281 0.000 0.449
Household constrained in income (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.901 1.000 0.297
Household constrained in wealth and income (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.263 0.000 0.440
Household unconstrained (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.080 0.000 0.271
Number of observations 1,249,355
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  Table 3: Optimal Portfolio Choice Baseline Results 
This table reports the optimal portfolio (i.e., optimal proportion of stocks, deposits, mortgage 
and housing) of the baseline optimization problem ( 95.0=β , 18.1=γ , 2=θ , 12/1=∆t , 
and 25.0=µ ), and the actual portfolio attending to the EFF information for seven subgroups 
referred to the head of household: age, education, degree of financial sophistication, economic 
sector of employment, labor situation, sex, income, net wealth, and type of financial 
constraints that household faces. The first group of columns reports the estimation of the 
optimal portfolio while the second group of columns reports the actual portfolio. The symbols 
** and * (^^ and ^) indicate whether the optimal shares are significantly higher (lower) than the 
observed shares at 1 and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
Stocks
Bank 
Time 
Deposits
Mortgage Housing Stocks
Bank 
Time 
Deposits
Mortgage Housing
All Individuals 0.016** 0.049** -0.347 1.282 0.006 0.031 -0.319 1.282
Less than 35 0.006** 0.052** -0.452 1.394 0.002 0.035 -0.430 1.394
Between 35 and 45 0.012** 0.048** -0.384 1.323 0.004 0.025 -0.353 1.323
Between 45 and 55 0.032** 0.046** -0.181 1.103 0.010 0.035 -0.147 1.103
More than 55 0.029** 0.045**  -0.125* 1.051 0.019 0.035 -0.104 1.051
Primary Education 0.007** 0.051** -0.387 1.329 0.001 0.025 -0.356 1.329
Secondary Education 0.019** 0.045** -0.329 1.265 0.006 0.035 -0.305 1.265
University Education 0.023** 0.051** -0.312 1.238 0.012 0.035 -0.285 1.238
Less Sophisticated 0.022** 0.044** -0.248 1.182 0.003 0.030 -0.213 1.182
Midly Sophisticated 0.014** 0.050** -0.367 1.303 0.006 0.031 -0.341 1.303
Highly Sophisticated 0.074^ 0.047^^  -0.052^^ 0.931 0.090 0.063 -0.086 0.931
Primary Sector 0.007** 0.057** -0.390 1.327 0.001 0.027 -0.353 1.327
Secondary Sector 0.016** 0.050** -0.408 1.342 0.006 0.033 -0.380 1.342
Tertiary Sector 0.017** 0.047** -0.323 1.259 0.006 0.032 -0.297 1.259
Employed 0.016** 0.047** -0.355 1.291 0.006 0.029 -0.327 1.291
Self-Employed 0.012** 0.055** -0.320 1.252 0.003 0.046 -0.301 1.252
Retired 0.041** 0.024**  -0.073** 1.008 0.014 0.019 -0.041 1.008
Unemployed/Non-Active 0.015** 0.052** -0.344 1.277 0.005 0.031 -0.313 1.277
Men 0.015** 0.050** -0.355 1.290 0.005 0.032 -0.326 1.290
Women 0.016** 0.046** -0.327 1.265 0.006 0.030 -0.302 1.265
Less than 20,000€ 0.015** 0.049** -0.328 1.264 0.002 0.031 -0.297 1.264
Between 20,000 and 40,000€ 0.012** 0.048** -0.387 1.327 0.002 0.027 -0.355 1.327
Between 40,000 and 60,000€ 0.011* 0.050** -0.358 1.297 0.008 0.034 -0.339 1.297
More than 60,000€ 0.034** 0.047 -0.261 1.180 0.020 0.040 -0.241 1.180
Less than 100,000€ 0.005** 0.053** -0.664 1.606 0.002 0.027 -0.635 1.606
Between 100,000 and 200,000€ 0.015** 0.046** -0.249 1.187 0.003 0.031 -0.222 1.187
Between 200,000 and 300,000€ 0.023** 0.049** -0.119 1.047 0.010 0.030 -0.087 1.047
More than 300,000€ 0.042** 0.048 -0.114 1.024 0.023 0.047 -0.093 1.024
Constrained in Wealth 0.002 0.054** -0.746 1.690 0.003 0.038 -0.731 1.690
Constrained in Income 0.014** 0.049** -0.352 1.289 0.005 0.030 -0.324 1.289
Constrained in Wealth and Income 0.002 0.056** -0.753 1.697 0.003 0.038 -0.737 1.697
Unconstrained 0.036** 0.048 -0.215 1.131 0.020 0.044 -0.194 1.131
All Individuals
Subgroup
Optimal Portfolio Observed Portfolio
Income
Net Wealth
Type of Financial Restrictions
Age
Education
Degree of Financial Sophistication
Economic Sector
Labor Situation
Sex
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  Table 4: Optimal Portfolio Choice Baseline Results 
This table reports the deviation between the optimal portfolio (i.e., optimal proportion of 
stocks, deposits, mortgage and housing) for the baseline optimization problem ( 95.0=β , 
18.1=γ , 2=θ , 12/1=∆t , and 25.0=µ ),  and the actual portfolio attending to the EFF 
information for the 2002 and 2005 surveys for seven subgroups which are referred to the head 
of household: age, education, degree of financial sophistication, economic sector of 
employment, labor situation, sex, income, net wealth, and type of financial constraints that 
household faces. The households employed in this analysis are the ones for which we have 
information from both surveys (we end with 130 households instead of 427 as in Table 3). The 
first group of columns reports the deviation between the optimal and the actual portfolios in 
2002 while the second group of columns reports the equivalent result in 2005. The symbols ** 
and * (^^ and ^) indicate whether the deviation between the optimal and observed shares is significantly 
higher (lower) than zero at 1 and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
Stocks
Bank 
Time 
Deposits
Mortgage Housing Stocks
Bank 
Time 
Deposits
Mortgage Housing
All Individuals 0.013** 0.017** -0.030 0.000 0.013** 0.012** -0.025 0.000
Less than 35 0.009** 0.023** -0.033 0.000 0.037**  -0.007^ -0.029 0.000
Between 35 and 45 0.003* 0.024** -0.026 0.000 0.007** 0.016** -0.024 0.000
Between 45 and 55 0.042**  -0.008^^ -0.034 0.000 0.008* 0.014** -0.022 0.000
More than 55 0.013** 0.015**  -0.028** 0.000 0.005 0.027** -0.031 0.000
Primary Education 0.005** 0.032** -0.037 0.000 0.013** 0.011** -0.023 0.000
Secondary Education 0.019** 0.010 -0.028 0.000 0.010** 0.016** -0.026 0.000
University Education 0.015** 0.010** -0.026 0.000 0.018** 0.007** -0.026 0.000
Less Sophisticated 0.062**   -0.033^^ -0.031 0.000 0.015** 0.011** -0.027 0.000
Midly Sophisticated 0.008** 0.022** -0.030 0.000 0.013** 0.012** -0.025 0.000
Highly Sophisticated -0.002  -0.056^^ 0.059^^ 0.000 0.029** -0.009^^ -0.021 0.000
Primary Sector 0.010** 0.025** -0.038 0.000 0.000 0.013** -0.011 0.000
Secondary Sector 0.024** 0.011 -0.035 0.000 0.005** 0.029** -0.035 0.000
Tertiary Sector 0.008** 0.018** -0.026 0.000 0.018** 0.006** -0.023 0.000
Employed 0.010** 0.023** -0.032 0.000 0.014** 0.012** -0.027 0.000
Self-Employed 0.015** 0.010* -0.026 0.000 0.013** 0.007** -0.020 0.000
Retired 0.045** 0.002**  -0.047** 0.000 0.004** 0.030** -0.035 0.000
Unemployed/Non-Active 0.038**  -0.025^^ -0.014 0.000 0.011** 0.000 -0.011 0.000
Men 0.015** 0.019** -0.034 0.000 0.007** 0.018** -0.026 0.000
Women 0.008** 0.010* -0.018 0.000 0.023** 0.001 -0.024 0.000
Less than 20,000€ 0.034** 0.004 -0.039 0.000 0.007** 0.027** -0.035 0.000
Between 20,000 and 40,000€ 0.010** 0.027** -0.037 0.000 0.013** 0.012** -0.024 0.000
Between 40,000 and 60,000€ -0.001 0.011** -0.011 0.000 0.026** 0.001  -0.029* 0.000
More than 60,000€ 0.006** 0.015** -0.021 0.000 0.007** 0.007** -0.013 0.000
Less than 100,000€ 0.004** 0.034** -0.039 0.000  -0.005^^ 0.030** -0.024 0.000
Between 100,000 and 200,000€ 0.014** 0.006 -0.020 0.000 0.006** 0.025** -0.032 0.000
Between 200,000 and 300,000€ 0.036** 0.009 -0.045 0.000 0.021** 0.008**  -0.029** 0.000
More than 300,000€ 0.008** 0.029** -0.022 0.000 0.013** 0.000  -0.013** 0.000
Constrained in Wealth 0.000 0.019** -0.021 0.000 0.000 0.019** -0.022 0.000
Constrained in Income 0.015** 0.017** -0.031 0.000 0.014** 0.012** -0.026 0.000
Constrained in Wealth and Income 0.000 0.020** -0.021 0.000 0.000 0.009** -0.010 0.000
Unconstrained 0.002 0.017** -0.014 0.000 0.005  -0.015^^ 0.010 0.000
All Individuals
Subgroup
Deviation from the optimal in 2002 Deviation from the optimal in 2005
Income
Net Wealth
Type of Financial Restrictions
Age
Education
Degree of Financial Sophistication
Economic Sector
Labor Situation
Sex
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 Table 5: Optimal Portfolio Choice for the Recent Homeowners 
This table reports the optimal portfolio (i.e. optimal proportion of stocks, deposits, mortgage 
and housing) of the baseline optimization problem ( 95.0=β , 18.1=γ , 2=θ , 12/1=∆t , 
and 25.0=µ ) for the recent homeowners. We distinguish the optimal portfolio for different 
subgroups referred to the head of household: age, education, degree of financial 
sophistication, economic sector of employment, labor situation, sex, income, net wealth, and 
type of financial constraints that household faces. The first group of columns reports the 
estimation of the optimal portfolio using the information of the housing buyers between 1997 
and 2001 in the 2002 survey. The second group of columns reports the estimation of the 
optimal portfolio using the information of the housing buyers between 2000 and 2004 in the 
2005 survey. 
Stocks
Bank 
Time 
Deposits
Mortgage Housing Stocks
Bank 
Time 
Deposits
Mortgage Housing
All Individuals 0.009 0.050 -0.493 1.434 0.016 0.052 -0.541 1.473
Less than 35 0.006 0.051 -0.544 1.487 0.016 0.052 -0.665 1.597
Between 35 and 45 0.006 0.050 -0.577 1.521 0.012 0.053 -0.483 1.418
Between 45 and 55 0.030 0.047 -0.257 1.180 0.017 0.048 -0.378 1.313
More than 55 0.007 0.050 -0.147 1.090 0.035 0.058 -0.385 1.291
Primary Education 0.005 0.051 -0.553 1.496 0.010 0.054 -0.516 1.452
Secondary Education 0.011 0.049 -0.491 1.431 0.016 0.052 -0.626 1.558
University Education 0.014 0.050 -0.404 1.341 0.021 0.049 -0.452 1.382
Less Sophisticated 0.027 0.045 -0.426 1.354 0.018 0.048 -0.393 1.327
Midly Sophisticated 0.007 0.051 -0.504 1.446 0.016 0.052 -0.559 1.491
Highly Sophisticated 0.089 0.041 -0.078 0.948 0.010 0.052 -0.438 1.376
Primary Sector 0.009 0.054 -0.568 1.505 0.011 0.063 -0.199 1.125
Secondary Sector 0.011 0.050 -0.523 1.461 0.013 0.051 -0.625 1.560
Tertiary Sector 0.009 0.050 -0.478 1.419 0.017 0.052 -0.538 1.470
Employed 0.008 0.048 -0.473 1.417 0.013 0.052 -0.572 1.507
Self-Employed 0.012 0.059 -0.635 1.564 0.015 0.056 -0.380 1.309
Retired 0.009 0.061 -0.039 0.969 0.021 0.050 -0.275 1.203
Unemployed/Non-Active 0.016 0.053 -0.504 1.434 0.026 0.049 -0.518 1.443
Men 0.009 0.051 -0.494 1.434 0.017 0.048 -0.560 1.495
Women 0.010 0.047 -0.490 1.433 0.014 0.057 -0.509 1.438
Less than 20,000€ 0.018 0.049 -0.457 1.390 0.011 0.054 -0.489 1.425
Between 20,000 and 40,000€ 0.007 0.050 -0.553 1.495 0.015 0.051 -0.691 1.625
Between 40,000 and 60,000€ 0.005 0.051 -0.522 1.467 0.011 0.052 -0.497 1.433
More than 60,000€ 0.005 0.051 -0.352 1.296 0.029 0.050 -0.358 1.280
Less than 100,000€ 0.002 0.054 -0.764 1.707 0.015 0.059 -1.103 2.029
Between 100,000 and 200,000€ 0.014 0.045 -0.335 1.276 0.006 0.051 -0.539 1.481
Between 200,000 and 300,000€ 0.024 0.042 -0.175 1.109 0.016 0.049 -0.325 1.260
More than 300,000€ 0.011 0.067 -0.180 1.102 0.039 0.048 -0.139 1.052
Constrained in Wealth 0.001 0.056 -0.789 1.732 0.014 0.056 -0.992 1.922
Constrained in Income 0.010 0.050 -0.504 1.443 0.014 0.052 -0.540 1.474
Constrained in Wealth and Income 0.001 0.057 -0.797 1.740 0.015 0.056 -0.992 1.921
Unconstrained 0.004 0.051 -0.297 1.241 0.045 0.047 -0.388 1.296
Subgroup
Type of Financial Restrictions
Optimal Portfolio for the Recent 
Homeowners in 2002
Optimal Portfolio for the Recent 
Homeowners in 2005
All Individuals
Age
Education
Degree of Financial Sophistication
Net Wealth
Labor Situation
Sex
Income
Economic Sector
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 Table 6: Optimal Portfolio Choice under Alternative Parameter’s Values 
This table reports the optimal portfolio choice under different parameter’s values. The results 
presented in this table correspond to the average of all the individuals’ portfolio choices using 
the subsample of 427 households (representative of 1,249,355 households) from the EFF 2002 
data. In the first column we show the different values employed for each parameter (beta, 
gamma, mu, time, loan-to-value ratio, and income over mortgage payment) while in the 
second column we show the optimal investment in the corresponding financial asset (stocks, 
bank time deposits, mortgage, and housing). 
Parameters Values Stocks Bank Time Deposits Mortgage Housing
Baseline (β=0.95) 0.016 0.049 -0.347 1.282
β=0.975 0.015 0.038 -0.335 1.282
β=0.99 0.015 0.030 -0.327 1.282
γ = 1.1 0.015 0.048 -0.345 1.282
Baseline (γ = 1.22) 0.015 0.050 -0.347 1.282
γ = 1.5 0.015 0.062 -0.359 1.282
µ = 0.15 0.016 0.040 -0.338 1.282
Baseline (µ = 0.25) 0.016 0.049 -0.347 1.282
µ = 0.35 0.014 0.057 -0.354 1.282
∆t = 1/24 0.014 0.052 -0.348 1.282
Baseline (∆t = 1/12) 0.016 0.049 -0.347 1.282
∆t = 1/4 0.025 0.019 -0.326 1.282
LTV = 70% 0.016 0.048 -0.333 1.270
Baseline (LTV = 80%) 0.016 0.049 -0.347 1.282
LTV = 90% 0.015 0.049 -0.352 1.287
IMP = 25% 0.016 0.049 -0.347 1.282
Baseline (IMP = 33%) 0.016 0.049 -0.347 1.282
IMP = 40% 0.016 0.049 -0.347 1.282
Mu
Time (Shock Duration in annual terms)
Loan-to-Value Ratio
Income over Mortgage Payment
Beta
Gamma
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 Table 7: Determinants of the Deviations from the Optimal Investment 
This table reports the determinants of the deviations from the optimal investment in stocks, 
deposits, and mortgage. Panel A reports the determinants of the deviations from the optimal 
investment in stocks. Panel B shows the results for the analysis of the deviations from the 
optimal investment in deposits. Panel C and shows the determinants of the deviations from the 
optimal investment in mortgage. The first sub-column in each panel reports the estimated 
coefficients and the second one the corresponding t-statistic. The symbol:  
*1 if men, 0 if women 
**1 if yes, 0 otherwise 
Panel A
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Logarithm of the net wealth 0.910 0.95 5.315 7.35
Logarithm of household income 0.424 1.78 -3.294 -7.65
Difference between the log of desired housing value
and the log of real housing value
Age of the head of household 0.053 1.21 0.140 5.73
Sex of the head of household* -0.500 -0.99 -0.991 -3.94
Head of household has primary education** -0.467 -0.87 -1.929 -6.37
Head of household has university education** 0.005 0.02 -0.092 -0.39
Head of household is self-employed** -0.113 -0.98 -0.768 -1.94
Head of household is retired** -0.141 -0.89 0.768 1.75
Head of household is unemployed or non-active** 0.491 1.17 0.459 1.61
Head of household works in the primary sector** -0.069 -0.73 0.169 0.38
Head of household works in the tertiary sector** -0.189 -2.00 0.001 0.00
Less sophisticated investor** 0.297 1.09 2.382 7.49
Highly sophisticated investors** -0.170 -0.04 -5.002 -3.87
Household constrained in wealth** 0.000 -0.59 0.000 2.02
Household constrained in income** -0.208 -0.32 -4.512 -5.48
Year of housing purchase 0.254 1.17 0.039 0.34
Constant -524.364 -1.17 -119.770 -0.51
Number of observations (using weights) 1,249,355 1,249,355
0.63 7.670.513 10.356
Over Investment Under Investment
 
Panel B
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Logarithm of the net wealth 3.374 7.48 -2.002 -8.97
Logarithm of household income -1.103 -1.93 1.147 8.25
Difference between the log of desired housing value
and the log of real housing value
Age of the head of household 0.102 3.84 0.005 0.70
Sex of the head of household* -0.869 -3.38 1.056 7.56
Head of household has primary education** -1.529 -12.75 0.087 0.36
Head of household has university education** -1.907 -2.91 -0.101 -0.30
Head of household is self-employed** 0.231 0.40 -0.707 -3.88
Head of household is retired** -0.151 -0.10 -1.807 -3.32
Head of household is unemployed or non-active** 1.021 4.75 0.629 1.80
Head of household works in the primary sector** 0.136 0.35 0.402 0.81
Head of household works in the tertiary sector** -0.005 -0.04 0.057 1.00
Less sophisticated investor** 1.393 3.90 -0.470 -1.88
Highly sophisticated investors** 1.792 2.21 1.259 0.62
Household constrained in wealth** 0.000 0.95 0.000 -5.52
Household constrained in income** -2.802 -2.96 1.472 5.20
Year of housing purchase 0.536 6.84 -0.135 -2.40
Constant -1110.688 -6.88 286.829 2.53
Number of observations (using weights) 1,249,355 1,249,355
Under Investment
11.299 -4.3198.12 -23.78
Over Investment
 
 48
Panel C
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Logarithm of the net wealth 0.444 1.69 -2.272 -8.54
Logarithm of household income 0.063 0.30 0.752 4.75
Difference between the log of desired housing value
and the log of real housing value
Age of the head of household 0.023 1.36 -0.005 -0.47
Sex of the head of household* -0.708 -1.91 0.961 3.36
Head of household has primary education** -0.244 -1.11 -0.244 -1.15
Head of household has university education** -0.257 -1.96 0.471 1.43
Head of household is self-employed** 0.338 0.59 -1.167 -3.18
Head of household is retired** 0.232 0.25 -0.704 -0.79
Head of household is unemployed or non-active** 0.042 0.17 -0.076 -0.27
Head of household works in the primary sector** -0.117 -0.56 0.182 0.40
Head of household works in the tertiary sector** 0.266 1.94 0.088 0.66
Less sophisticated investor** 0.121 0.53 -0.164 -0.57
Highly sophisticated investors** 2.523 7.08 -1.157 -2.42
Household constrained in wealth** 0.000 -0.27 0.000 -3.60
Household constrained in income** -0.381 -0.98 1.570 4.60
Year of housing purchase 0.223 7.15 -0.370 -8.39
Constant -454.164 -7.27 765.143 8.67
Number of observations (using weights) 1,249,355 1,249,355
-16.412.76
Over Investment Under Investment
-5.2392.556
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 Figure 1: Timing for asset trade, consumption and interest earned 
This figure illustrates the order of the different events. At the beginning of period t the interest 
earned from the portfolio between period t and t+1, which was determined on t-1, is paid out 
in advance. Then, the taste shock is realized. Given the taste shock, the household chooses 
consumption subject to its current liquidity constraint, and also the portfolio composition for 
next period. Then, the state of nature is realized. At the end of period t, the order is executed 
on the market, and thus, the portfolio composition on t+1 is determined. 
New order placed
Consumption (Ct) and portfolio decision
Order executedState of nature
Interest earned (Rt)
t
t+1
Taste shock (Xt)
 
